


JPRS-EER-90-119  
20 AUGUST 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-90-119

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## INTRABLOC

### Schaff on International Movement of Future Socialism, Publication

90EP0730A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 27,  
7 Jul 90 p 13

[Article by Adam Schaff: "Ecumenical Socialism: The Birth of a New International"]

[Text] Toward the end of last March, a presentation was held in Madrid of the first issue of the periodical THE SOCIALISM OF THE FUTURE, published by the European Socialist Movement, an alliance of all the major groupings whose aim is—I beg the pardon of hypersensitive readers—"the victory of the new socialist society."

• • •

Twice, already, I spoke on Polish television about the preparations for forming that movement, and I hope to do it again once it is formed and that, as part of the new democratic order in our country, there will no longer exist a "Berufsverbot" for Marxists. In the meantime, I avail myself of the hospitality of POLITYKA so as to publish somewhat more rapidly pertinent information, because I gather, from reading the press and conversing, that many of my compatriots feel that socialism has gone from the world. But, on the contrary, Socialism will be, I believe, as of 1992 the dominant direction in West Europe.

But first a few words about that periodical, THE SOCIALISM OF THE FUTURE.

Actually, it had been decided upon already two years ago, but it took that long to prepare its publication owing to the politically complex nature of the matter and the organizational problems involved in publishing a periodical in seven European countries, in seven different languages—Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian, Russian, German, and English. The title of the periodical (which is also the name of the Movement) is significant: THE SOCIALISM OF THE FUTURE, rather than THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM. This is an important difference. The leadership of the Movement and the periodical takes the position that the victory of socialism as the New Society—a name I find in the new Program Manifesto of the Socialist Party of Spain, or PSOE, is indubitable but, in view of the spate of crises in recent times, and especially in view of the collapse of the countries of so-called real socialism, the question of the nature of that socialism remains open. Hence the need for a great, international "brainstorming" on this issue, beginning with the meaning of "socialism" nowadays, and this aim is to be served by the new periodical.

Second, the new periodical emphasizes the ecumenical-socialist nature of the Movement, which constitutes the first—since the breakup of the Socialist International in 1917—step toward the unification of socialists, at least as regards the rethinking of theory and ideology. This is

something new which goes farther than the formerly practiced United Front. This is demonstrated by the concept enunciated by the organizers who worked in the Steering Committee, namely, the chairman, Alfonso Guerra, the vice president of Spain; the vice chairmen Oscar Lafontaine and Adam Schaff, and the members, namely, Michel Rocard, premier of France, Jorge Semorun [as given], Giorgio Napolitano, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, and others, and in the Editorial Committee with its more than 50 personages of the European Left representing a variety of views and party affiliations. The first issue of the periodical opens with articles by the heads of three main directions of contemporary socialist world politics: Mikhail Gorbachev (the Third International), Willy Brandt (the Second International), and Ernest Mandel (the Fourth International)—I am naming them in the order in which their articles appear.

There is a so-called Discussion Forum for each country which will, after the publication of each issue (the periodical is of a monograph nature, with each issue to be devoted to a selected problem, such as the meaning of socialism nowadays), organize nationwide discussion among representatives of all the directions of socialist thought existing in a given region and, thus, promote their mutual contacts and rapprochement.

What resonance has this new periodical produced? Judging from the first presentation in Madrid (the presentation of the second issue will probably be held in Moscow, which assures in advance a multiplied resonance in view of the sensational nature of this event), it was a triumph. We will begin with the presence of an overflow audience which, for three hours, listened to speeches by leading West European politicians. I regret to be displeasing to our antisocialists who dream of a conservative, neoliberal, capitalist Europe: on both sides of the discussion table there sat only socialists, and they focused their fire on neoliberalism, on the lies of the "free market" proclaimed in the name of monopoly capitalism "multio" [as published]. These socialists desire the New Society and proclaim the need for a united front of socialist movements against the offensive of monopoly capital. (All this is recorded on a professional videotape, which is available.)

And that is the point, so far as the issue is viewed by our enthusiasts for a capitalist Poland. What should be done with Europe, with its leaders, to whom we are and shall be going with our requests, hat in hand, on overcoming our distaste for any socialism? After all, the Americans will give us nothing, as they already stated clearly. Mr. Kohl's Germans also will give us nothing, because now they have the GDR, and our only hope is that Lafontaine may win. But he is a socialist, and so are others. (The fate of the conservative government in England seems to be a foregone conclusion.) Thus, they are going in a direction opposed to ours: we want a "free market" and capitalism, while they are—even if their socialist tendencies are viewed skeptically—opposed to neoliberalism. The speeches of Rocard Martell (Craxi's deputy), Alfonso



Guerra, and Felipe Gonzales shook me up, because they sounded like anti-Balcerowicz philippics.

What is coming next?

The Movement and the periodical are eliciting great interest, because much indicates that Europe is orienting itself toward socialism. One more thing that may be of interest to Polish readers (and will certainly shock some of them): as known, in Latin America there exists the powerful multimillion Liberation Theology movement which combines Catholicism (in the spirit of primitive Christianity) with Marxism and the ideology of a distinctive socialism. That movement is so powerful that even the Vatican has abandoned active opposition to Liberation Theology (also out of fear of a schism). It is clear that in the future we shall assume contact with that movement, the more so considering that Spain still maintains privileged ties with that continent (if only owing to a common language). For the time being, for practical reasons, we confine ourselves to Europe. But in Spain itself there exists a similar movement, which has besides provided some inspiration for Liberation Theology. It is concentrated in Catalonia, the most industrialized region of Spain, and bears the name "Christians for Socialism." It associates priests (chiefly Jesuits), nuns, and lay Catholics, who relate their orthodox Catholicism to Marxism (for the most part they are members of the Communist Party of Catalonia). I am linked by longtime bonds of friendship and cooperation to members of that movement. Well, under the influence of the Socialism of the Future they founded a genuinely ecumenical organization (Catholics, Communists, socialists, and major trade union federations of Catalonia) in the form of a foundation (an organizational form that is popular in Spain, probably for financial reasons) called Fundacion Utopia, on elegantly defining utopia as "everything that does not exist nowadays but could exist." This is the platform of The Socialism of the Future.

The foundation is headed by its animator and my old friend, the Jesuit Father Professor Juan Garcia-Nieto. It will be formally inaugurated in Barcelona on 1 October, and, on the invitation of the Jesuit chairman of the foundation, I am to deliver the inaugural address on the subject "The Technological Revolution and the Future of Socialism."

The purpose of this narrative is to demonstrate the course of cooperation based on faith in socialism and its social power, however strange this may seem in Poland.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Response to Social Democratic Election Defeat

90CH0319B Prague FORUM in Czech 11 Jul 90 p 4

[Address by Ivan Svitak: "Crisis of the Non-Communist Left"]

[Text] The lack of distinction, the fragmentation and a lack of a clear and specific program obviously were the main causes of the defeat suffered in the elections by the so-called traditional left-wing parties, which consequently benefited the Communists. Individual parties reacted differently to the situation which had thus developed, but naturally, the greatest surprise seems the development in the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party [CSSD] which culminated by the expulsion of that party's most prominent personality, Rudolf Battek. Undoubtedly, that party's great tradition certainly belongs in the political spectrum of our contemporary society. In the discussion about the causes of such an unusual situation in that party we present here an address by Ivan Svitak at the meeting of the regional committee of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy in Plzen on 23 June 1990:

Strong people seek the causes of their failures in themselves and do not project their own faults to others in order to absolve themselves. They know that each disaster is an existential situation in which we better realize our limitations, and thus, defeats in fact help make us more truthful, more authentic, and more understanding. Defeats strengthen the strong and break the weak; consequently, they will break the current leadership of the CSSD but strengthen the idea of social democracy. What are the real causes of errors that the current leadership cannot correct and must therefore look for the offenders outside its own circle?

1. The congress committed a catastrophic error when it permitted an antagonistic faction from abroad to transfer its personal controversies to the congress which restored the party in Prague. A lawyer from New York, who had been absent from Czechoslovakia for the past 42 years, was elected to represent the workers' class.

2. The congress offered an unattractive picture of social democracy as a split party which had chosen an erroneous strategy of confrontation with the Civic Forum, an undistinguished program and impossible election tactics that were not based on an idea but rather on an outworn tradition. The new congress must create a programmatic base for a modern left-wing party—not for a left center. Either we shall function as a socialist, workers' party and defend national ownership and neutrality of the CSFR, or there can be no future for us.

3. The congress committed its greatest suicidal attempt by raising personal interests of a group of apparatchiks above the objective interests of our state and democracy which is now being reborn, and of the workers' class which was waiting for an alternative to communism.

4. [Jiri] Horak's UVV [Central Election Committee] mismanaged the whole election campaign, as evident from statistical data on the waning interest of the voters who were turning away from the social democratic party the more they were learning about its candidates and its embarrassingly bemused slogans that sounded no different than slogans of other parties. The party could

not offer any alternatives—such as neutrality, democratic socialism, and protection of nationalized enterprises—which would make it set it completely apart from the uncritical enthusiasm for market relations, from indifference to the occupation, and from any illusions about the shortcuts on our way to Europe.

5. If we intended to bestow the palm of defeat to some individual from the UVV, it would go to Premysl Janyr whose daily PRAVO LIDU was, and still is, such a disastrous publication that the pleasure offered by its editor in chief to its readers may be compared to a visit to a dentist who will extract your molar without any anesthetic. The UVV failed to realize that its task of first importance was, and still is, to renew PRAVO LIDU as a daily with the ideological background of the European left and not to create a paid apparatus. Premysl Janyr and his group have done everything to antagonize ideas, intellectuals, and open discussions.

6. The most embarrassing political error was the demand that the CPCZ be banned; that confirms the pseudo-democratic character of the majority of the UVV which openly clamors for the discipline of "democratic centralism."

7. The postelection period has shown the wretchedness of most of the UVV mainly because of its inability to gather enough courage to assume responsibility for its total flop and to resign. They should have looked to the example set by the leadership of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, but they failed to do so. Thus, the only option that remains is to promptly convoke a regular congress and expel the gravediggers of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy from the UVV.

8. After two weeks of vacillation, the majority of the UVV decided by 36 against 26 votes to identify as the cause of its defeat the newly-elected deputy, Rudolf Battek, one of the five social democrats who were elected on the ballot of the Civic Forum. He was expelled from the ranks of the CSSD whose leadership by this unconscionable act tried to distract attention from its own incompetence.

9. To reduce deep-rooted causes of the defeat in the elections to personal rivalry between two candidates for the chairmanship is so insultingly stupid that it forever disqualifies the 356 individuals who voted for this tomfoolery committed by Horak—not for political reasons but because of such a low IQ that it is a matter of our self-preservation against aggressive stupidity not to give them another chance.

10. The future of social democracy depends on its cooperation with the Civic Forum, otherwise the party has no future. Every competent strategist will understand that after a lost battle he must unify the forces of different units and expand his potential with alliances. Who in fact was the man whom the well-experienced schemer from the Council of "Free Czechoslovakia" had the nerve to "expel" from the ranks of social democrats? This a honorary member of the UVV in exile since 1983 had spent ten years in prison for his dedication to

freedom; he cofounded the Movement for Civic Freedom, and coauthored an excellent program of that movement (in the autumn of 1988); as a member of a group he, together with Albert Cerny, Tomas Hradilek, Jindrich Konecny, Stefan Guerther, and Jaroslav Meznik, laid the groundwork for the renewal of social democracy long before the nimble attorney began building up his power structure; he was a member of the Civic Forum in the days of the revolution and a prominent figure of the Coordinating Center of that movement. It is a small wonder that the schemer from New York suffers from a well-deserved minority complex because glaring differences ipso facto put him on the back burner.

It is the ultimate demagoguery to start expulsions in order to help the UVV cover up its own strategic and tactical mistakes that caused the worst defeat in the history of the CSSD. Before the communal elections we need to overcome controversies and not to aggravate them, and if we intend to overcome the defeat with the independent strategy of Horak's leadership, we must unite forces with Battek's clubs of the Civic Forum.

#### A Personal Note

To answer the question posed by Eng. Miroslav Langasek, whether I would like to become presidential advisor (PRAVO LIDU 14 June 1990), I should like to say that my ambitions have never reach such a low point where I would aspire to serve as a page to a duke. I realize that Mr. Langasek cannot attribute to me some higher aims because he is limited by the imagination of his own low horizon. In addition, he is furious that rather than in a deputy's seat, he will have to nestle his intellect in a rickety chair of a mini-party's apparatus. I would gladly pass to him the professorship I have relinquished in the United States, but because he is totally unqualified, he cannot get the appointment. However, the same quality renders him a hopeful pretendent for the position of a presidential advisor, among which group Mr. Langasek can find kindred characters.

#### Circumstances Surrounding Pavel Wonka's Death Reexamined

90CH0319A Prague FORUM in Czech 11 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Iveta Vrbova : "I Was Beaten Up but Not Heard (How Pavel Wonka Suffered and Died)"]

[Text] If a journalist can at all deal with the tragedy of Pavel Wonka who died in the prison in Hradec Kralove on 26 April 1988, then unfortunately he can do so only in a cursory manner. Official witnesses who could shed light on many circumstances are refusing to make any public statements. For instance, to this day the chief physician of the prison department of Bohnice the psychiatric institution has not received—as she maintains—any reply from the Ministry of Justice concerning this matter. I thought that the era when one had to fear punishment for expressing one's opinion was gone forever. This certainly is neither a matter of publication of

medical documentation, which after all could have been falsified, nor of the stopped process of criminal prosecution in the matter of Pavel Wonka's death in 1988. Nor is this a matter of yellow journalism. This case concerns a man's untimely and unnecessary death whose cause remains officially listed as pulmonary embolism.

#### His Penultimate Arrest in August 1987

"...I was transferred to Minkovice where legally I should never have been taken. I have been here well over a month during which I was tortured physically as well as psychologically and also by the exposure to cold, so that I have collapsed of cold twice already. I have reached the conviction that this action against me is organized from the center, as confirmed to me by a member of the National Security Corps ... I am subjected to psychological torture and deprived of all my rights; I live here hearing only noise, curses, and harassment. Since 17 August 1987 I have been in isolation or solitary detention. I am taken for walks alone and am being supervised by a special unit ... In addition, I am suffering from serious psychological problems stemming from my sentence which culminated an incredible persecution. My category of values has collapsed... the living conditions created for me are unbearable and life has lost all meaning for me... My health problems increased following my incarceration in cell No 17. I was not capable of moving at all. The cell was extremely drafty; windows in other cells were closed, but the window in my cell was left open and my cell turned into a wind tunnel. The draft gnawed at my joints; I suffered from unbearable arthritic pains in my hips and knees. During the day my legs were rigid and turned blue, I had cramps and lost mobility in my legs... The National Prison in Minkovice was planned for violent criminals. It was easy to make the situation there unbearable for me. I should like to stress that no one from the National Prison Administration wants to speak with me; I experienced oppression, threats, torture and punishment... In my opinion, all this smacks of attempted murder..." (From the records of Pavel Wonka's court hearings on 26 September 1987)

He served his sentence in two other penitentiaries and finally in the above-mentioned prison department of the psychiatric institution in Bohnice from which he was released in February 1988.

#### Mother

"He went to prison a completely healthy man. He returned from prison in a dreadful condition. He could not walk, his legs were swollen, he was short of breath. Never before did he want to emigrate; he used to say that his place was in this country, but after his prison experience, he could see no other solution but emigration. He was summoned to the OVS [District Military Administration] in Trutnov about some documents. I kept telling him: 'Don't you go there—it is a trap,' but he did go."

The pretext for his last arrest on 5 April 1988 was his failure to comply with parole regulations—specifically, the obligation to report every day at 1500 hours to the Security Corps.

"In the condition he was in, he could not comply with parole regulations. His health was extremely poor but he would say: 'What kind of a life is this? If I want to visit my grandmother who lives four kilometers from here, I must apply for permission two weeks in advance. Even a murderer has no such obligation.'"

After Pavel Wonka was arrested, Mrs. Wonka did not learn about his whereabouts until two days before his death. Wonka's last letter was addressed to his attorney, Doctor of Law Jelinek from the Office of Legal Counsel in Hradec Kralove. For two years the letter was kept secret from Wonka's mother: "I ask you to immediately take all possible steps so that my family can be promptly heard. Pay no attention to the way this case is formulated. I am suffering from pains of my motor system and from renal pains. As you know, I had to sleep under an open window, which was no fun. I was subjected to considerable torture and violence. The charge alleges that some of it was imaginary. Somethings were done legally, others covertly. During my first arrest, my hands were crippled and during my second arrest, so were other parts of my body, because there were certain individuals who would beat me with a billy club on the palms of my hands and on my frozen toes even as I was being taken to a physician. Submit a report to the OVP [expansion unknown] in Hradec Kralove and to the superintendent of the EVS [expansion unknown], or if possible, assign that task to my family. I have not received the charge and the detention order. My detention was allegedly ordered by District Officer Horvatova, 3T, District Administration in Trutnov. I sent to Chairman Mjartan a general complaint about my case as well as a complaint concerning my detention. My detention was ordered while I was comatous and could not get a hearing... After this dictation I feel completely exhausted. Act vigorously in my defense, cooperate with my family, and keep trying to obtain information. I do not know if I can survive this ordeal..." He dictated his letter to his fellow inmate because he was no longer able to write.

"After Pavel died, I feared that I would lose Jirka (Ed. note: Pavel Wonka's brother) as well. He kept saying over and over: 'It would be better if I were dead.'"

In death, Pavel looked dreadful. He had lost more than 20 kg; instead of his thick black hair and beard, his head was covered with reddish fuzz. I would not be able to recognize him at all if it were not for a tooth that he had chipped as a child and that was visible in his slightly open lips."

#### The Witness

From the testimony written in April 1990 by his fellow inmate in the prison in Hradec Kralove:

"Very sophisticated methods that left no marks were used. It was no embolism—it was a murder.... Pavel Wonka had declared a hunger strike but the doctors paid no attention to that; food continued to be pushed over to his cell, although usually when a prisoner would go on a hunger strike he would be isolated and given special



medical care. Not so in the case of Pavel Wonka; he was with two Roms... Furthermore, I want to mention what I had witnessed once as I was being taken for dental treatment; in the hall I noticed a puddle of water and I heard his screams as he was being beaten; no one could go out. They took him out from the cell, stripped him naked and hanged him by hands on the bars on the partition; he was suspended so that the soles of his feet were ten centimeters above the floor and he was doused with water from a hose. In a pail they had five truncheons ready. Five members of the National Security Corps took part in beating on him until he was no longer able to scream. He just wheezed, and we had to listen to it...

"I know that Pavel Wonka was unable to walk normally and that his body was infested with worms; the doctors were aware of that, they would examine him but those check-ups found Pavel to be in good health, as though nothing was the matter. Pavel Wonka was always treated as quite healthy, even when we brought him to the clinic the day before his death... It was a premeditated murder."

#### Why All That

In his letter addressed to the office of the General Prosecutor he wrote from the prison in Hradec in early April 1988: "I am not permitted to live a normal life in this state nor am I permitted to leave."

The reason why he was not allowed to live here or anywhere else is best explained in a fragment from the "inciting" and "dangerous" Election Program of Pavel Wonka as an independent candidate to the Chamber of the People of the CSSR Federal Assembly in 1987, for which Wonka was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment.

"With horror, and profoundly shaken, I follow the current situation of legal nihilism which has overtaken our entire society... I see the roots of legal nihilism primarily in the disdain for laws and overemphasis on the ideological superstructure. A secondary expression of legal nihilism is the fact that citizens clearly recognize serious discrepancies between words and deeds as well between our legal system and its practical application... My basic program as a deputy to the Federal Assembly is to eradicate legal nihilism from our public life and enforce the true meaning and purpose of law in every sector of our public life."

On 10 August 1987 he wrote from prison: "Laws do not serve the power alone they must also serve the people, every individual citizen whose freedom they must define and whose rights they must protect. However, it is a very ominous matter if a group of 'functionaries assumes' the interpretation and application of laws in the state and for whatever reason begins to use them to persecute individuals and groups and completely suppresses the function of laws as protectors of the persecuted."

An even more ominous fact is that even after his death Pavel Wonka does not let some people sleep in peace. Someone has hacked swastikas under his name on a simple wooden cross. Just as before the seventeenth of November, the same State Security agent in plain clothes continues to hang around the Wonkas' family house.

#### POLAND

##### Israeli Ambassador Comments on Anti-Semitism

90EP0709A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 26, 1 Jul 90 pp 5-6

[Interview with Israeli Ambassador to Poland Mordechai D. Palzur, by Piotr Andrzejewski and Wieslaw Kot: "The Art of Remembering"]

[Text] [WPROST] We have Israeli diplomatic representation in Warsaw again. Have our countries grown very apart during the past 20 years?

[Palzur] Unfortunately, there's no doubt about this. What's more, people in our country thought Poland was doing everything it could to increase the distance.

[WPROST] Poland, as a nation, or the officials in Warsaw?

[Palzur] In 1967, Poland severed diplomatic relations with Israel, although, from what I hear today, this was by no means reflected public attitudes. After 1968, thousands of Polish Jews were exiled. There were people who had been raised here, people who considered themselves Poles, although they were of the Jewish faith. One fine day they were told to pack their bags and get out. Soon, too, Poland came out unequivocally on the side of our enemies. At the UN, Polish representatives approved every anti-Israeli resolution without any hesitation.

[WPROST] During the years of the "Brezhnev doctrine," Polish officials didn't have much room for maneuvering, but during that entire period Poland still came out for Israel's right to exist.

[Palzur] We knew that the negative phenomena in relations between our countries were not an expression of Poland's sovereign will. The breaking of diplomatic relations with Israel was most certainly not on Poland's own initiative either, but all these things created considerable distance between our two countries.

[WPROST] Despite all this, don't you see areas in which the bonds were not severed?

[Palzur] Fortunately, the doors could never be hermetically sealed. A few people received exit visas. In Warsaw, the Netherlands Embassy had a section to handle Israeli affairs, but the stream was a rather narrow one. There is an office of the Polish Savings Bank in Israel, operating under the PKO branch in Paris, and Polish books were sold in the book stores, but if we take into account the fact that there are more than half a million people born



in Poland, or of Polish descent, living in Israel, it's hard to call this more than a drop in the bucket in terms of the need.

[WPROST] How did this situation influence the way Israelis viewed Poland and Poles?

[Palzur] The impact was undoubtedly negative. Unfortunately, in Israel—and elsewhere too—there are people who are anti-Polish.

[WPROST] Those forced to emigrate?

[Palzur] For the most part, yes. People forced to leave just because they were Jews—there were tens of thousands of such people—have no reason to have warm feelings towards Poland. These are people who were told: "Jews, off with you; go to Palestine!"

[WPROST] But what is your attitude toward the stereotype of the antisemitic Pole?

[Palzur] I have to make a clear distinction here between myself as a private person and as the ambassador from Israel. As a private person, I can say that my friends and relatives were well treated in Poland. My family, on my mother's side, had lived here for more than 300 years. They came here from Austria during the time of Jan Sobieski III. There were many artists and writers on this side of the family. My father fought for Poland's freedom during World War I, and he fought as a captain in the Polish Army during the Bolshevik campaign. Unfortunately, because of his origin, he was rejected from service in Anders' army. Therefore, he travelled from Russia to Iran as a civil servant attached to the army. In all, our family has nothing to complain about against the Poles. So, when I was offered the post in Poland, I agreed. I wouldn't have done it, if I had a bad attitude towards you, because instead of developing relations, I would work to spoil things. As ambassador, I represent the citizens of my country, and, although I have not personally encountered antisemitism, many of my citizens come to me with various matters of this sort. Some make the accusation that in places where concentration camps used to be, like Majdanek, there is nothing to indicate that most of the victims were Jews. Others tell about incidents where Jewish cemeteries have been defiled. There have also been cases where groups of young Jews, traveling to discover their Polish roots, have been subjected to abusive language and insults. Finally, there are a number of financial problems concerning real estate which former owners had here.

[WPROST] The relationship between the Poles and the Jews is rarely ambivalent. It oscillates between Semitism and antisemitism.

[Palzur] Indeed. I myself have run into many semitists looking for Jews among their ancestors. After all, times change. Not many young Poles have seen "real" Jews. They've only seen movies like "Fiddler on the Roof." The church's attitude toward Jews has also changed. I have to tell you that in the prewar years, and before that

time, to put it mildly, the church did not have a friendly attitude toward the Jews. After all, to this very day, there are people who blame the Jews for the crucifixion of Christ, as well as those who claim that when we make matzo, we add some Christian child's blood to it.

[WPROST] There are not many Jews in Poland today, but it turns out that antisemitism can exist even without Jews.

[Palzur] I heard that the Russian revolution stirred up the Jews. PAMIAT even says that it was they who murdered the czar. There are those who say that Stalin and Beria were Jews. What is more, when I came to Poland, I heard that the father of Mr. Cyrankiewicz, who was premier for many years and who came from Tarnow, was a Jew with the name of Zimmermann. He supposedly had a pharmacy there, in Tarnow. I asked myself: How is it possible that my father, rest his soul, had lived there, near him for so many years, and was the same age as Cyrankiewicz, but had said nothing to me about him when he became premier? I took an interest in the matter, and it soon became apparent that it was all nonsense. Cyrankiewicz wasn't a Jew. I don't even know if he came from Tarnow at all.

[WPROST] Galicia, where you come from, is a melting-pot. It is mentioned as an example of a good center of Polish-Jewish culture. What are your recollections of the area?

[Palzur] I studied in a Polish school, and that's how I happen to know Polish.

[WPROST] You speak Polish perfectly.

[Palzur] My family was religious but not orthodox. On the holy days we went to the synagogue. On Friday night we burned candles. I didn't have any sense of antisemitism in daily life in Tarnow, despite the fact that I was the only Jew in my class. In the morning, when all the pupils prayed, I was the only one who did not participate. For religion class, I went to the rabbi. Despite the fact that the Second Republic brought Jews equal political rights and there were Jewish deputies in the Sejm, Jews were traditionally considered second-class citizens. After all, for many years, every nobleman had a Jew who handled his finances, but the nobleman gave his instructions seated behind a table, while the Jew stood there and listened, and he was not basically invited to sit down at the table. My cousin, Roman Brandstaetter, who also came from Tarnow, writes about this in his memoirs.

But I want to emphasize that Polish-Jewish relations should not be viewed solely in dark colors. After all, Poland opened up its gates to Jews in periods when other countries were driving them beyond their borders. And, since there were 3.5 million Jews in this land before the war and Poland had the largest Jewish community in Europe, this fact alone already goes to show that if it had been so bad for them here, there wouldn't have been so many of them here.

[WPROST] Let's get away from history, which is often painful, and move on to contemporary matters. Do you see the possibility of closer economic ties between Poland and Israel, and for using what is called the "Jewish lobby" in the world economy in order to support Polish interests? Some sentiment for the Poles remains in many influential Jews.

[Palzur] Yes, but this is a long process. In Israel I know a lot of Jews with close ties to Poland who grieved for many years over the fact that they couldn't come here. The breaking of relations between our country was sudden, like the fall of the guillotine, but building up economic ties is not so simple. People have to become reacquainted, come here several times, investigate the situation on the spot, before they can start investing or creating joint-ventures. This process began about three years ago, when I convinced the foreign affairs minister at the time to give Polish visas to Israelis without any obstacles and make it possible for Poles to go to Israel. After all, there is already a new generation of Poles and Israelis who don't know anything about one another, but they don't have all this baggage from the past either. We should bank on their mutual relationships.

[WPROST] In Poland Jewish quips are a way of getting closer through laughter. How do you view Jewish jokes?

[Palzur] I don't view them as anything bad, except that when I tell a joke about Jews, nobody can accuse me of ill will, but when you do it, somebody could take you for being antisemitic. The reverse is also true: What would you all say if I were to tell you "Polish jokes"?

#### **Presidential, Defense Ministry's Retreat Centers Detailed**

90EP0711A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY  
in Polish 1 Jul 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Elzbieta Burzynska-Miszczak and Lech Krysztalowicz: "A Center Under Particular Scrutiny: The Government's Retreat in Lansk and the President's at Lake Omulew"]

[Text] The fame of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] center in Lansk has reached far beyond the borders of the Olsztyn Voivodship. Few people used to know about the Military Recreation Center at Lake Omulew, even though it had performed a similar function for years. It is here that the president of the Polish Republic comes to take his rest.

Until recently, however, everything associated with Omulew was a secret. The center has a history of almost 50 years of operation. During one of his hunting expeditions, Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski, an avid hunter, came upon some small buildings in a picture-perfect setting on the shores of Lake Omulew. He decided to set up a hunting lodge there. He never did carry out his plan, because he returned to the USSR. His

successor, Marshal Marian Spychalski, initially disapproved of his predecessor's wishes, but with time he himself came to be fond of hunting. Then he recalled the plan conceived long before.

At the beginning of the 1960's, Omulew was one modest cottage and a small service staff. The expansion of the center moved full-speed ahead under the administration of Lt. Col. Wladyslaw Sztern. After him, Col. Babicz was commander for a short time. Then the stormy epoch of Warrant Officer Wladyslaw Werner set in. He was promoted to captain during the course of his service at Omulew. There are many legends about Cpt. Werner, who has been deceased for two years now. He was arrogant and aggressive, and he liked to hold wild parties, which were talked about for miles around. Werner found his place of eternal rest in the avenue of military personnel at the communal cemetery in Olsztyn. He was followed at Omulew by a man of a diametrically opposed type—Col. Julian Borkowski.

The center is made up of several parts. Omulew, on the lake of the same name, is the principal portion. Here stands a tiny hotel, the commander's duty room and a building for the soldiers, pigsties and subsidiary buildings. In addition to this, the center also has two boarding houses (a luxury boarding house in Czarny Piec and one of modest standards in Uscianek), as well as two forester's lodges set up as boarding houses (Debowa Kepa and Grobka). Eight Mikolajki-type cottages are available in Kota.

Financing for the upkeep of the center comes primarily from hunters who pay in foreign currencies. Fishing areas occupy 35,000 hectares in three gminas: Nidzica, Jedwabno and Olsztynek. The center also leases 400 hectares of arable land and meadows, as well as 100 hectares of Lake Omulew and the small Black Lake. Unauthorized entry into these bodies of water is prohibited. This is also the case with the land of the key part of the center—12 hectares and tracts and protected areas in forests—40 hectares, on which mouflon and fallow deer are raised. Just recently the center was hoping to add Reed Lake and Blejki, but the new situation in Poland halted the expansion.

In past years, Omulew was often visited by various important personages. More than one of its guests proposed building or buying a summer home here. Often this later took place at the expense of permanent local residents.

Thirteen years ago old Palgan worked in the Nidzica forest district administration. His wife was raising three children. The house they occupied was the property of the State Forests.

Palgan's wife told us this story: "One day the army came to us. They took measurements and wrote things down. They said that they would move us to better quarters. In a week a truck arrived. Soldiers moved out our things. Apparently the army had paid the forest district administration 96,000 zlotys for the house. Gen. Obiedzinski,

former WP [Polish Army] quartermaster, bought the house right after we moved out."

Milewski, a resident of Wykno, a village encircling Omulew, experienced another adventure. Having despaired of the conditions under which he had to live with his four children, he squatted at the country house of a Warsaw resident, Urbanowicz. The case came to court. However, before the decision was handed down, he applied to emigrate to the FRG. His request was approved by the fourth day. His preparations for departure were underway when martial law was imposed. Despite the blocked borders, in January 1982, the Milewskis were in the FRG. Previously all his applications to emigrate had been denied. The country house was restored to its owner.

Local residents are also bowled over by other events related to the presence of the army on these lands. For example, there is the story still being told about the stone road from Muszaki to Zimna Woda. Several years ago (no one knows at whose order) soldiers dug out the stones from a 100-meter section and transported them in an unknown direction. Similar stone may be seen in the foundations of the country homes of several important personages. When the affair became public knowledge and a commission to study the matter appeared, some people suddenly began to stucco their cottages. Shortly after this event, Gen. Obiedzinski was no longer chief quartermaster of the WP, and Cpt. Werner was no longer commander of Omulew. Recently the center has been spoken of in terms of the issue of the manmade lake. People were provoked that in the land of a thousand lakes another, manmade one should be created. "There is nothing to get excited about here," says Col. Borkowski. "In front of the center was a swamp, a breeding ground for mosquitoes which left their mark on our guests with a vengeance. Today, instead of a five hectare swamp, we have a nice two hectare lake and a good piece of meadowland. This investment cost the army a total of 78 million zlotys."

The commander maintains that the little lake acts as a water retention reservoir for the surrounding meadows, which are almost always saturated. He plans to stock the lake with fish.

Czarny Piec and the manmade lake, which have created such a stir, are well known to foreign hunters. For several years now the center has been known in the FRG as Czarny Piec-Hochwildrevier (an area rich in fauna). It primarily serves tourists from the FRG, Switzerland, Spain, and Austria. The daily rate ranges from DM160-180 for a room with bath. This rate includes meals and hunting services. A foreign hunter pays up to DM11,500 for exporting the horns of a bison he has killed, although average-sized horns (4-4.5 kg) are taken out, for the most part, at a cost of DM1,600. A wild boarskin costs from DM520-1600. According to the Omulew commander, last year the center made DM300,000 on hunting, which ensured its financial self-sufficiency. Until last year, the center transferred the foreign exchange it had brought in

to a MON [Ministry of National Defense] account. With the foreign exchange, MON purchased medicine and medical equipment for its health service. Since the beginning of this year, like all units of the socialized economy, it must resell foreign exchange to the state.

Uscianek, the other hunting lodge, which is situated on the grounds of the Muszaki artillery range, now takes in only Polish nationals due to its lower standards. In the past, primarily prominent Poles and official foreign guests (Marshal Kulikov and the chiefs of the Finnish, the NRD and even the Cuban armies) hunted here. Gen. Bordzilowski, who is remembered as the "muscleman" by former subordinates, even shared the lock-up with his junior officers. His hunting expedition on the protected three-hectare fire-barrage strip of land, during which he killed ten does, has become part of the history of Omulew. Omulew finds itself in constant conflict with the peasants whose fields lie within the compass of fishing districts leased by the center. Last year the center paid 300 million zlotys in damages. Farmers believe that the commission appraises losses low; meanwhile, appraisers suspect peasants of chicanery. Farmers are angered not only by the greed for forest animals but also by the results of the center's activity.

River waters blocked off by eel traps and floodgates (an illegal activity) are flooding the meadows, overflowing the fields. For years interlake canals, which drain off excess water from the fields and meadows and foster the self-cleaning of the bodies of water, have been impassable. In the future this may cause the lakes to atrophy. People are saying that the reservoirs are already beginning to become choked out and overgrown. They blame the army for this. Commander Borkowski says that he is a great nature lover. Two years ago, seven families of beavers were settled on one of the rivers. Borkowski cares for the fallow deer and mouflon brought in by his predecessors. The herd is increasing from year to year. He cleans the mouth of the Omulew River and drives away poachers. He dreams of opening a beaver reserve near Lake Omulew. Although it is easy to criticize the work of the center, one must admit that, thanks to the fact that mass tourism is prohibited on the land, a lot of virgin nature has been preserved in the area. Sea eagles, osprey and kites live there.

Some people doubt the purity of Col. Borkowski's intentions. They believe that he is aiming to hold onto influence in the Lake Omulew area. Those who hold this opinion argue using against him the words of one of the MON chiefs, who apparently said: "I would prefer to give away ten tanks than to lose the Black Lake."

Activists from the Citizens Committee in nearby Nidzica maintain that the center's occupation of a part of the Lake Omulew waters and the entire Black Lake, and the prohibition against fishing and bathing, are illegal. In actuality, they say, Black Lake is reserved exclusively for Gen. Siwicki, who likes to fish there. The truth no doubt lies somewhere in between.



Let us return, however, to the main building of Omulew, where President Wojciech Jaruzelski likes to take his rest (although this is happening less and less often).

The little country inn has an upstairs and downstairs, and seven rooms plus servants' quarters. The ground floor has a small dining room which is also used as a parlor. It is decorated in a hunting style, with much wood and horns, and and a fireplace. It is homey, moderate, in good taste, unsumptuous. More than one country house in the area surpasses the center in standards and luxury. Next to the dining room is the president's three-room apartment: couches covered with folk-type spreads and typical folk furniture. The president values simplicity. He likes to rest at the center, reading books on a blanket spread out in the fresh air. He is not fond of hunting, although he sometimes does participate in it. Gen. Siwicki and Gen. Kiszczak, on the other hand, are avid hunters.

The national defense minister has an apartment upstairs with two rooms and a bath. It is decorated and furnished much like the presidential apartment. All rooms in the country inn have Polish-made colored television sets and most have Polish-made videotape players. The quality of the bathrooms is that of the better "M-3" hotel. By comparison with the residences of Honecker, Ceausescu or Zivkov shown on television, Omulew is like a compact versus a Mercedes. The chief attraction is the always lovely natural surroundings.

Mrs. Jaruzelski loves being at Omulew (she comes here more often than her husband) with their daughter. Moreover, the president's wife has her private country house not far away, in Natacia Mala (its previous owner was Karol Loch, who emigrated to the FRG). Her neighbor there is Col. Gornicki; her former neighbor was Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.

A staff of 120 services the needs of the center. This includes soldiers in active service. Most of the employees (both civilian and military) are transported here by car from Nidzica. With them in mind, about 20 years ago, eight Mikolajki-type cottages of reeds and stucco were built in Kota. Inside they have a fully-equipped kitchen, three homey furnished rooms, and a garage on the ground floor. They are surrounded by greenery, trimmed hedges, and asphalt roads. Omulew's employees were supposed to live here so that they would not have to be brought in from Nidzica. The idea never came to fruition. People did not want to spend their lives in the middle of the forest. Thus it was decided to organize a retreat in Kota, but it never drew crowds of vacationers.

The existence of Omulew is nothing new; such facilities are found all over the world. But they should not be a hideaway for the pursuit of private interests and illegal activities. For years Omulew had functioned, for all practical purposes, outside the law. It is not the only center of its kind in Olsztyn Voivodship. In addition to URM's above-mentioned Lansk center, the Ministry of Internal Affairs also has its center here. This center is

made up of two hunting lodges in the Ostrowin and Orlik forester's lodges. These also have their stories.

### **Regulski on Challenges, Tasks of Local Self-Government Bodies**

90EP0732B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
16-17 Jun 90 p 3

[Statements by Jerzy Regulski, government plenipotentiary for local self-government, as recorded by Jan Forowicz: "The Beginning of the Road: Local Self-Government"]

[Text] Self-government reform is only beginning instead of having ended with the elections. Major institutional changes will occur in practically every domain of life, Professor Jerzy Regulski, the government representative for local self-government, told RZECZPOSPOLITA.

[Below are Regulski's verbatim statements:] At present gmina self-governments are becoming a new political force. Fifty two thousand councilmen elected by popular vote will decide on many important issues. They will become a motive power of changes, and inevitably they will also cause many conflicts. Still, these are necessary in order to hasten restructuring the country. I believe that we should take a highly positive position toward many of the solutions proposed by the elected gmina councils. At any rate, the government must develop a policy of its own toward local self-governments.

I would like gmina-council members and the entire public to realize the importance of the tasks that must be undertaken in the immediate future. These tasks are chiefly linked to the new concept of financial management at gminas, to the need to change substantive law, and to the fact that nowadays it is no longer possible to resolve any issue, whether it be environmental protection or educational reforms, without consulting the concerned local communities.

A separate and difficult subject is the 95,000 officials, employees of the old basic-level state administration, who are gradually to be incorporated in self-government administration. The reorganization should be so prepared that the new offices would cope with their tasks now, as well as after 1990. In such a situation, extensive coordination is needed in order to, among other things, facilitate for gmina councils decisions concerning personnel hiring and proper salaries, including the pay of individuals in various new positions, e.g., village administrators.

The self-government reform is resulting in new institutions, for example, there will arise inter-gmina unions and associations of similar gminas. Even now some thought has to be given to voivodship dietines and the probable rise of a national union of gminas representing local interests.

A large number of varied problems may be entailed in the economic transformations; it is important to assure



orderly proceedings as regards the law on ownership. There is no time to waste. We are facing the question of the legal transfer to the gminas of 1,400 enterprises which had been established by former [unelected] city and gmina managers as parent agencies. This also concerns 150 enterprises whose parent agencies were voivodes. We must expect the rise of a large number of claims by private individuals desirous of recovering property which in the past they used to own. It is necessary to define the related procedures.

The takeover of fixed assets should be preceded by taking their inventory. Thus, throughout Poland it will be necessary to appraise the value of every state-owned building, enterprise, or land plot, to determine their rightful owners, etc. Municipal service enterprises, serving an area larger than that of one gmina, will have to be broken up or covered by inter-gmina agreements.

Every gmina council will, let us hope, begin to be interested in promoting the growth of their gmina. This should be planned wisely, because this is a novelty to us.

Another problem is that many gminas nowadays are in debt. Irrespective of the solutions proposed in this connection by the Ministry of Finance, there is a need for proposals by self-government bodies, made upon consulting the community. We realize the importance of legal regulations governing gmina revenues and a program for reducing gmina indebtedness. Work on these problems is in an advanced stage.

The processes of change have barely begun. This is a difficult time. Hence, I call upon all institutions to cooperate with local self-governments, respect their competences, and facilitate the birth of gmina councils. The government is deeply interested in maintaining relations of partnership with local self-governments.

I wish that the people would be aware of the scope of this reform, because they themselves will be implementing it.

### **FRG Silesian Activist Attends Friendship Society Meeting**

90EP0773A Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish  
23 Jul 90 pp 1-2

[Article by Remigiusz Jakubowski: "Doctor Hupka in Dobrodzien"]

[Text] Dr. Herbert Hupka was the most important. At least that was the implication of the comments by the participants of the meeting. The 74-year-old chairman of the Association of Silesian Compatriots and deputy chairman of the Union of Expelees spoke briefly "in a European manner" and in a non-confrontational style. He recalled his own Silesian origins and stated that there is no conflict between Poles and Germans and that native residents of Silesia have a right to self-determination. His comments provoked applause from the nearly 1,000 in attendance.

I met Dr. Hupka three years ago in Bavaria. I attempted then, unsuccessfully, to get an interview. This time I was more careful. I asked George Brylka for help and an introduction. He achieved nothing. I attempted myself.

"It is too early for a comment; there has been too much mistrust between us," argues the grey-headed politician refusing, and then he looks at those present.

The hall of the Unity Production Cooperative is full to the last seat. On the wall the slogan of the meeting "Schlesien—unser Heimatland: Wir verlassen Dich nicht." [Silesia, our fatherland: We Will Not Leave You.]

The discussion proceeds to the measure of well-known German melodies. George Brylka tells the participants that "industriousness and loyalty to the Polish government has always been a characteristic of the Germans from this region, in spite of the fact that they were forbidden to speak German and obligatory Polonization was introduced.... The breakthrough occurred on 14 November 1989, after the Mazowiecki-Kohl meeting and the joint Polish-German declaration. From that moment, we have been able to cultivate our native language, articulate our own views."

Brylka, citing the saying that it is better to lose with a wise person than gain with a fool calls for economic cooperation with the Germans. There are many reasons for this deriving from the particular role of Silesia in the future Europe.

George Brylka is the deputy chairman of the Circle for German Friendship in Dobrodzien. The Circle has 1,400 members, and Dobrodzien has 2,800 residents. In other words, half the town claims German nationality.

"The circle was formed last year," says Brylka, "and Poles can be honorary members if they desire to join."

Saturday afternoon and sunny weather favors not only political discussions and relaxation, but also small business deals. Beneficial ones, too. For 13,000 zloty I bought SCHLESISCHE NACHRICHTEN ZEITUNG FUR SCHLESIEN; "Our 56 Songs," an interesting collection of German songs; and "Away to Heaven," a selection of religious prayers.

Gertrud C. was also buying. She is delighted that Dr. Herbert Hupka has come to Dobrodzien.

"For us it is a great honor."

"No one expected it," she says. "It is too bad Mr. Koschyk and Mr. Habsburg are not here."

Hartmut Koschyk and Otto von Habsburg did not come to Dobrodzien. Nevertheless they visited other towns in the Opole region of Silesia during this period. The first is secretary general of the Union of Expelees; the second is a deputy for the CSU [Christian Social Union] to the European Parliament and president of the International

Pan-European Union. Hartmut Koschyk is an interesting figure. He is the author of the so-called way of Silesia. This conception, in general terms, reduces to creating a new European territory on the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line. "Peace," in the opinion of Koschyk, is possible in this regions only by a "free ballot." Briefly, the people of Silesia should settle their future in a referendum. If it is favorable, Koschyk proposes to form an autonomous European region with its own self-government.

"What is the attitude of the members of the Circle for German Friendship in Dobrodzien to Koschyk's idea, which is supported by Otto von Habsburg?," I asked George Brylka. He responds that the issue has not been examined by the Circle's board. Nevertheless, in his private opinion, there is nothing wrong with people expressing themselves on the subject in a referendum.

"We must think in a European manner," he adds. And in this way great politics reaches Dobrodzien. I wanted to ask Dr. Hupka a similar question. But the rights of the Polish people of German origin, which the Polish government conscientiously is supporting, and a change in the boundaries of Poland are two completely different matters. Dr. Hupka, a sharp politician, however sensed, I think, the danger of the subject, and no conversation took place, although I, too, was thinking in European categories.

The Saturday happening in Dobrodzien ended about 1900 hours. The cameraman serving the event is taking his last pictures. The cassette from the meeting will go to Bonn. Some of the participants get into a bus and depart for the FRG; some get in cars and return to Zabrze, Lubon, Opole, and other cities. The rest remain. I said good-bye to a few not far from the church of St. Magdalena. Father Alfred Waindok, the parish priest, receives me warmly.

"Yes, it is true," he says. "There have been demands for mass in German and have been regularly. If someone wants to pray, I have no aversion to any language. From Whit Sunday in June, in addition to the May services in German, three masses have been held in German. Next year there is a chance that such services will be held regularly every Sunday."

As I left Father Waindok says, that he does not know how things will develop. But people are changing. A valuable observation.

#### **Legislation Seeks To Create New Appellate Court System**

90EP0732A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
13-14 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Falk: "The Third Level of Justice: Appellate Courts"]

[Text] As of 1 October, appellate courts are to be established in Poland according to the government draft

of a decree recently presented to the Sejm. The purpose of these courts will be to consider appeals and complaints against the verdicts of voivodship courts issued in the first instance.

Like district and voivodship courts, appellate courts are to belong in the system of common courts. Once they are established, a three-level judiciary system will begin to operate in this country. But this does not mean that cases have to be considered by three judicial instances.

The two-instance principle in the judiciary will be retained, and even extended to matters concerning social insurance (heretofore a one-instance issue). Thus, appeals against the verdicts of district courts will continue to be considered by voivodship courts, but appeals against the verdicts of voivodship courts will be considered by appellate courts instead of the Supreme Court. This will make it easier for citizens to avail themselves of means of appeal and accelerate the resolution of their appeals; in addition, it will lighten the burden of the Supreme Court.

That is so because, until now, the Supreme Court has been devoting a great deal of time to considering ordinary appeals. In the future, that court will be able to focus on considering extraordinary appeals, passing resolutions interpreting norms of law that may raise doubts, and granting answers to legal questions addressed by common courts. These are important tasks, and their purpose is to unify judicial decisionmaking and assure its correctness.

As of 1 January 1991, certain changes in the competences of district and voivodship courts are to take place. District courts, to which citizens have the easiest access, will consider relatively minor cases, while voivodship courts will consider major and legally more complex cases.

The competences of voivodship courts will include, e.g., cases of protection of personal rights and interests, divorce and invalidation of marriage, and civil claims concerning more than 20 million zlotys, as well as major criminal cases such as homicide, robbery, or major crimes against property, etc.

Once this new law is adopted, the National Judiciary Council will submit to the president recommendations for the appointment of judges of the appellate courts from among candidates nominated by the judiciary community and the minister of justice. They must have high professional qualifications and at least five years of experience on the bench.

It is expected that some 170 judges will be appointed to the ten appellate courts that are to be established.

### **New Law To Offer Greater Freedom in Setting Up Trade Unions**

90EP0766A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
19 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Jan Forowicz: "New Law on Syndicates"]

[Text] The two draft laws which were discussed on 18 June by the Senate Commission on Initiatives and Legislative Work are a forecast of new legislation regulating union activity and collective bargaining.

They were prepared by a team under the direction of Senator Prof. Tadeusz Zielinski. The distinguishing feature of the draft law on employee trade unions is respect for the principle of full freedom in the organizing of syndicates [based on the French word for "trade unions"]—a union can be formed on the strength of a resolution by even the smallest group of employees. The organizing of various nationwide union associations does not require prior permission from any authority. Registration in court leads mainly to obtainment of legal entity status.

The intention to assure union freedoms and effective obtainment of agreement also comes through in the draft law on collective bargaining. This law states that one side in these types of bargainings are not only the syndicates, but also nonunion strike committees.

The and other legislative proposals (it is also anticipated that a draft law prepared by NSZZ "Solidarity" will be submitted), promise that there will be a speedy end to the "wartime" [martial law] union law passed in 1982.

### **Elite National School for Public Administration Established**

90EP0726A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
8 Jun 90 pp 1-3

[Article by Jan Forowicz: "Elite Schools"]

[Text] Rumor has it that Poland is going to be having the first truly elite school to train top government bureaucrats. The Council of Ministers created the National School of Public Administration [Krajowa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej] on 30 May. Docent Dr. Hab. Maria Gintowt-Jankowicz was appointed director of KSAP.

Docent Gintowt-Jankowicz told *RZECZPOSPOLITA* that it would be KSAP's task to prepare personnel for the ministries, government oversight bodies, and voivodship offices. We have to develop competent, professional bureaucrats to handle government affairs. In their work these people must remain politically neutral, so that changes in the government leadership or parliamentary configurations do not upset the administrative units which create solutions and see that official decisions are carried out.

The prevailing stereotypes may hamper the school's success. The first might be characterized as the call for "Less government in the private lives of citizens!" The second is the stereotype of the bureaucrat as a person of secondary significance in everything that is going on in the country. It is for this very reason that KSAP should be not only an institution which trains the elite but also a promoter of basic values, such as the ethic of civilian service to the government.

The urgent personnel needs call for the creation of an apprenticeship school. It will be difficult to fulfill this task, and this fact shows how new the school's aspirations are, because we have a number of fine teachers in higher education, but we lack practical administrators capable of passing on their knowledge. KSAP will be a nonuniversity institution. We will base our work on other people's experience. Using the model of France's Ecole National d'Administration, we will have basically no staff of our own. We will invite outside people to conduct the classes. Permanent staff will be minimized. This should be a genuine center. I attach a great deal of significance not only to direct, practical matters but also to efficiency, aesthetics, and modern equipment in the facility. I say that the conditions under which learning takes place contribute to the formations of the graduate.

During the initial period KSAP will permit college graduates with various majors to take competitive entrance examinations. Then we will work to supplement and consolidate their knowledge. A final selection will be made at the end of two or three months. We will accept young people with a high grade average who demonstrate a fluent knowledge of at least one international language. Seminars, panels, and report writing will predominate in the curriculum. We also anticipate internships at home and abroad. Three sections have been proposed: general administration, public finance administration, and foreign affairs administration.

Docent Dr. Hab. Maria Gintowt-Jankowicz works at the Department of Finance and Finance Law at the University of Warsaw. She is credited with the recent Polish edition of P. M. Gaudement's "Public Finance" [Finanse publiczne], published by PWE [State Economic Publishing House]. She is also a Senate expert and an adviser to OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club]. She is not now and never has been a member of any political party.

### **Union for Real Politics Supports Fall Elections**

90P20096B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
10 Jul 90 p 1

[Under rubric: "Yesterday...in Poland"]

[Text] The Executive Council of the Union for Real Politics, in a special declaration, expressed satisfaction that its postulate to hold elections this fall is coming closer to being realized.



### Change in Left-Wing Deputy Seating Arrangement

90P20095A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 32,  
11 Aug p 3]

[Unattributed article under rubric "Politics and Morals"]

[Text] It is foreseen that after the vacation break some of the deputies will be seated in different areas. For example, the deputies from the Polish Social Democratic Union will not be seated together with the members of the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left.

### Wloclawek PSL Opposes Religious Instruction in Schools

90P20096F Warsaw *TRYBUNA* in Polish 29 Jun 90 p 1

[Position statement issued by Wojciech Obernikowicz speaking for the Presidium of the Voivodship Administration of the Polish Peasant Party in Wloclawek]

[Text] The Presidium of the Voivodship Administration of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] in Wloclawek, in taking part in the discussion on the future and specific law, the model of education and its current problems, states the following (...). The state school should remain a secular school, and based on this, we view attempts to introduce religion as a required subject into the curriculum as inappropriate.

The PSL—which is in substance a Christian party—attaches great importance to catechization, as it forms, in a large degree, the morals of the pupils. For that very reason the PSL thinks that the application of any kind of institutionalized pressure would, in fact, produce a result in opposition to that desired. Also, not without meaning for the purposes of our position, is the fact that the time period for religious instruction is to be two hours weekly. This cannot be reconciled with the drastic crowding in our schools and, related to this, the necessity to schedule two, and sometimes even three, shifts of classroom instruction, especially in the cities (...).

### Political Party Development, Citizens Committees' Role Examined

90EP0731A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
13-14 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Dariusz Aleksandrowicz, philosopher, Department of Social Sciences, University of Wroclaw, by Bozena Wawrzewska; place and date not given: "Political Games"]

[Text] [Wawrzewska] How would you describe the present-day political scene?

[Aleksandrowicz] A year ago I had expected that the then, nascent political parties would play a major role. But this did not happen. I was particularly wrong about the liberals. Of the liberal groupings there emerged, or rather survived on the political arena, Janusz Korwin-Mikke's Union for Real Politics, which, however, does

not engage in constructive politics and sometimes even compromises the liberal option.

[Wawrzewska] What about the other parties?

[Aleksandrowicz] Within the crystallizing movements the rule is that political activity is, on the one hand, confined to ideological confrontation with other groupings and, on the other, supercharged with symbolism. The symbolism predominates over pragmatism. In party declarations what matters most is who will raise higher a banner with some, symbolic device rather than, e.g., an alternative economic program.

Another characteristic feature of the new political parties is the search for enemies, for political adversaries. I would call this the confrontational option. The leaders of these parties fail to perceive that both the confrontational and the ideological-symbolic options are not topical.

[Wawrzewska] What are the causes of this behavior?

[Aleksandrowicz] This seems to be a proof of political immaturity. It is a truism that in the past society lacked the possibility of participating in political life. Hence, behavior, characteristic of a juvenile age, is applied to politics. The need is to identify with something—hence the appeals to symbols, to ideals, instead of for a constructive solution of problems. I believe that certain social groups have not yet, in a sense, crossed the threshold that was conquered a year ago when the point was to destabilize an unwanted system in order to facilitate getting disentangled from it. Nowadays, this model of political struggle still survives in certain circles. But in my opinion this is no longer a viable political option.

[Wawrzewska] You said something about a search for an enemy. Who is the struggle against, and by whom?

[Aleksandrowicz] I cannot be more precise about it. But in any society, when a political system collapses, there exist many forces which had contributed to destabilizing the old system but failed to join the new current, the new establishment. These victors got no spoils, so to speak. One such group is young people. It was chiefly they who had organized the street demonstrations and clashed with the ZOMO [Motorized Detachments of Citizens' Militia]. But once the political system changed, the need for activities of this kind, and their chief instigators, was no longer there.

There also exist other groups which now feel frustrated. They include some among the circles of the former opposition who failed to be included in the new power elite and must start all over again trying to achieve something. This may be extremely dangerous, because they may tend toward a confrontation with the forces stabilizing the present political system.

[Wawrzewska] In your opinion, what are these stabilizing forces?



[Aleksandrowicz] Above all, there are the citizens' committees. In democratic countries the normal political system is served by political parties. In this country there is no such system, and, hence, its existing counterpart is being utilized. It is only right anyhow, because public life should arise on the existing base, rather than on some artificially created base modeled after a theory. Thus, we have citizens' committees.

[Wawrzewska] In your opinion, what accounts for their superiority to other groupings?

[Aleksandrowicz] They have two assets. The first is that they are identified with the symbolism of Solidarity, and the second is their pragmatic value, so to speak: they are a force which tries to stabilize the political system. As known, in a sense, the government stands behind these committees; that is, they support a certain coherent economic and political program resulting in support from, among other things, international credit institutions. As known, citizens' committees will not oppose, at grassroot levels, the programs proposed by the government or the parliament.

[Wawrzewska] The committees will be subject to various influences. How do you perceive their role?

[Aleksandrowicz] I conceive them as integrative bodies, bodies that stabilize the political system at the regional level. It would not be good if they were to change into a national party, because then they would actually break up into several opposing parties.

[Wawrzewska] Do you think that a struggle for influence will begin within the committees?

[Aleksandrowicz] This is highly likely, particularly before the anticipated elections to the parliament. Even now, for example, it can be seen that to Lech Walesa the Citizens' Committee under the NSZZ Solidarity Chairman may be a means of achieving his objectives. Of course, it is difficult to describe these objectives exactly and with certainty. Of a certainty, they include his wanting to be president of the republic. As for anything more, Walesa has not made it clear. Sometimes it is difficult to know what he wants. Besides, he acts equivocally. In the context of the [recent] Slupsk [railwaymen's wildcat] strike, he has turned from a spokesman of "war of all against all" into a spokesman of peace. Walesa correctly guessed that his political importance is based on, among other things, his remaining aligned with some actual political center, and stabilizing that alignment, whereas, by donning war paint and hurling the gauntlet at the government, he would have simply become one of three challengers, along with Jurczyk and Miodowicz [trade union leaders]. In institutional terms, Walesa is outside the centers of formal power. Thus, he will probably develop the Citizens' Committee under the NSZZ Chairman into a center which should facilitate his gaining the presidency of the republic.

[Wawrzewska] This means that political games will be played off stage, not only outside the parliament, but also outside the normal political alignment usually created by parties.

[Aleksandrowicz] Here, citizens' committees may play a role which, in normal conditions, is played by political groupings. But still, this kind of politics, and the struggle and disputes it involves, is outmoded.

[Wawrzewska] In your opinion, what is the right place for Walesa?

[Aleksandrowicz] Walesa's role in what has happened in Poland cannot be overestimated. He based his strength on playing a game with the government, and he played it, first of all, skillfully and, second, with great empathy for what people were expecting of him. The masses could identify with him. Now the situation has changed, but he has not assumed a new role. Political movements, which are needed in Poland and have a chance for social acceptance, [are] the movements which shift emphasis from the ideological confrontationism characteristic of the 1960s to a pragmatic-integrative concept.

[Wawrzewska] Could thus the citizens' committees be utilized to destabilize rather than stabilize the political alignment in this country?

[Aleksandrowicz] That is difficult to say, but the aim should be to prevent this.

### **Green Party Supports Walesa Presidency**

90P20096C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
26 Jun 90 p 1

[Under rubric: "Yesterday...in Poland"]

[Text] The Polish Green Party [PPZ] has declared itself in favor of the candidacy of Lech Walesa for the office of president. In the opinion of the PPZ, this would allow for the dissolution of parliament, the announcement of new elections, and the election of the next president of the Polish Republic.

### **Rural Solidarity Leader on Peasant Unrest, Protest Threat**

90EP0722A Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish  
11 Jul 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Wincenty Rogoz, chairman, Voivodship Council, Rural Solidarity in Katowice, by Hanna Smolanska; place and date not given: "Farmers' Demands"]

[Text] [Smolanska] You are again threatening a protest. How can you in good conscience mistreat the government so much?

[Rogoz] This is our own government, yes, but it also should think of us.

[Smolanska] What is really the problem? The absence of a program for agricultural development or the lack of consistency in implementing such a program?

[Rogoz] There is no clear program. Rural policy is being pursued in a bad direction. The country is bestrewn with farm produce, the growth of exports is slow, the incomes of farmers are shrinking, and their debts rising. Living standards in the countryside have declined.

[Smolanska] But not just in the countryside. Everyone is tightening his belt.

[Rogoz] But more so in country than in town. And farmers will not let themselves be deceived, because land will not bear deceit.

[Smolanska] Your demands are focused on guaranteed prices. But the government cannot consent to that.

[Rogoz] There must be prices that assure at least a minimum profitability.

[Smolanska] If such prices are fixed, retail prices of food will rise immediately, and this will result in wage increases, as well as in increases in the prices of farm machinery and fertilizers. The spiral will be wound up again and inflation will revive.

[Rogoz] Does it really have to be so? After all, we now demand [a guaranteed price of] 90,000 zlotys per quintal of wheat, which sells for 100,000 zlotys on the free market. Consumers pay 100,000 zlotys and that is it. To put it simply, we desire a guarantee that somebody will buy that wheat, that we can grow wheat.

[Smolanska] The demand for farm products has declined, understandably. The [high] prices are damping the demand. Food used to be cheap and hoarded.

[Rogoz] One should practice moderation when buying.

[Smolanska] Yes, but if we practice moderation this means a surplus of farm products on your hands.

[Rogoz] What about exports? It turns out that Poland can export a great deal.

[Smolanska] On condition that buyers can be found. The quality of our farm products is deplorable. Of course the farmers themselves can hardly be blamed for it.

[Rogoz] We all are a little to blame. For years agricultural specialization was neglected, so that farm products are of improper quality. The British standards for ungraded milk are ten times as strict as the Polish standards for grade-A milk.

[Smolanska] Yet you want to abolish milk grading.

[Rogoz] The point is not to abolish milk grading but to prevent varying kinds of milk from reaching the common vat at the dairy plant. Something must change in the dairy industry.

[Smolanska] Perhaps the funds which the government has decided to allocate to developing the dairy industry will change the situation somewhat.

[Rogoz] It is high time.

[Smolanska] You also demand low-interest credit.

[Rogoz] Consider that agriculture is a specific branch of the economy and one that is subsidized throughout the world. We all must show concern for agriculture. Consumers should be aware of this.

[Smolanska] Do not you think that we all have become accustomed to waiting for something instead of taking matters into our own hands? For example, instead of bemoaning our agrarian structure, should not you consider how to put land to best use?

[Rogoz] I was in the West. There I saw ten and 100 hectare farms. Both have equal right to exist. I agree that expert advice, specialization, and a developed food-processing industry are needed.

[Smolanska] That is a longterm program. But what will happen soon? Do you think that the government will give in to your demands?

[Rogoz] It should give in. If not, that will be a tragedy for the countryside.

[Smolanska] But what if it does not and, instead, continues to consistently translate into reality its program, a program which, after all, is very coherent?

[Rogoz] It is difficult for me to answer this precisely at present, but I think that history will repeat itself.

[Smolanska] Thank you for the interview.

#### **Rural Solidarity Demands Unbiased Agriculture, Union Media Coverage**

*90EP0715A Warsaw TYGODNIK ROLNIKOW  
SOLIDARNOSC in Polish No 23, 10 Jun 90 p 3*

[Excerpts of open letter to Andrzej Drawicz, chairman, Committee for Radio and Television, signed by Gabriel Janowski, chairman, and Piotr Dabrowski, deputy chairman, NSZZ RI "S" [Rural Solidarity]]

[Text] (...) The rural community feels resentful, interpreting the lack of adequate TV coverage of the complex problems of agriculture as a slight and a disregard. Nourishment-related issues concern all of society in an obvious way. They should, therefore, be presented at such a time, in such a manner, and to such a degree so as to reach everyone's awareness. The condition for the success of any social or economic policy is familiarity with it as well as understanding and support for it. This basic condition has not as yet been fulfilled. This pertains, in particular, to the most difficult area—that of agricultural policy. A policy that applies to the most sensitive market—that of food. The treatment, thus far, by the television medium of this area of life and work

evokes fundamental opposition, deepens the state of social mistrust, and does not simplify the situation of the government but leads to mutual bias and distrust.

The increasing state of "social misunderstanding" between farmers and the government, between the city and rural areas, presents itself as a dire threat to our future. It brings about protests, controlled by no one, which can lead to tragedy. Alongside this, the so common attitudes of "waiting things out." Peasant voices, proposals, and protests are not only not understood but to the core deceptively and insultingly treated as "laments and demands." It is claimed that we do not have a program, without giving us the opportunity to speak out freely. Meanwhile, it [the program] is formulated if only in the agreements of the agricultural "round table." Nothing good can be built on hasty conclusions or ready simplifications. We are losing precious time and wasting unique opportunities.

In your hands, Mr. Chairman, lies the possibility of avoiding many unnecessary losses and conflicts. We do not need "Conflict" but "Closer Ties." The rural community cannot remain a "country on the outskirts of the city." Farmers will not allow themselves to be treated like an unruly object of the reform, a troublesome petitioner, or a threat to the "urban" political system. We must, at all costs, understand and communicate with each other!

Therefore, we once again—publicly this time—announce the Union's readiness to work in cooperation with the media in programs that will contribute to the forming of a true picture of the rural community and farming and that will allow vital issues to be raised.

We expect:

- The guaranteeing of the possibility of periodic conveying, by way of television, of the most important union news at a time convenient for farmers.
- Objective television reports, broadcast at a time when television is watched by urban dwellers, depicting the reality, both good and bad, of life and work in rural areas.
- A regular, weekly journal devoted to the problems of farming and food supplies to be broadcast during prime time, with the participation of our union's representatives, and conducted in a manner enabling an honest discussion. (...)

Signed: Gabriel Janowski, chairman, NSZZ RI "Solidarity," and Piotr Dabrowski, deputy chairman, NSZZ RI "Solidarity"

#### Radio-TV Joins European Union

90P20096A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
10 Jul 90 p 1

[Under rubric: "Yesterday...in Poland"]

[Text] "Polish Radio and Television" has become an affiliate member of the European Radio-Television

Union. Membership in the union opens possibilities of program exchanges, and participation in competitions, festivals, and the like.

#### TV Executive Rebuts Criticisms, Outlines Program Changes

90EP0725A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
12 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Jan Dworak, deputy chairman, Committee for Radio and Television, by Joanna Stempien; place and date not given: "Television Under Pressure"]

[Text] [Stempien] You are directly responsible for the work of the Polish Television group, TVP. It has recently been receiving criticism from various forces on our political scene.

[Dworak] I would divide the criticism directed at us into two categories. The first consists of criticism of the quality of the group's work, and here we humbly accept all justified comments and try to take them into account in daily practice. The latter—let's not hide it—more severe type of criticism is the result of the continual pressure between the world of politics and the world of the mass media. Today, therefore, television is bearing the cost of normalizing the Polish organism. Let's realize that in authoritarian systems no public criticism of the mass media is tolerated.

Television had already gone through several waves of severe attacks from the world of politics. There was a time when peasant groups were making the attacks. There was a time when the pressures came from parliamentary circles. Every new political organization generally begins its life by trying to get control of television. This always happens with the charge that television lacks objectivity, that it manipulates.

[Stempien] The thread of criticism—let's agree to call it "political criticism"—has become clearly stronger. What are the accusations you face most often?

[Dworak] This sort of criticism actually boils down to the charge of being manipulative. The charge usually hides discomfort over the fact that we are not putting enough emphasis on the actions of a particular person or group in political life, that we do not give enough attention to the correct reasoning of one side or another in a conflict. Our deliberate objectivity assumed a priori is unfortunately interpreted as...partiality. Meanwhile, we try to see that television presents the justification and rationale of all important participants in community life clearly, fairly, and exactly, thereby enhancing public communication. I'm convinced that we're to some extent successful in doing this. The first example is that we worked out the principle of reporting on the meetings and congresses of the main sociopolitical groups. While the congresses are in session we present ten-minute information programs in the evening. In this way,



regardless of the political leanings of the TVP leadership, we reported on the last PZPR congress and on the congresses of ZSL, Solidarity, and OPZZ. We want to maintain this parity in the future too. Nor do our leanings have a bearing on the form of television reporting. I think that the reporting reflects the many faces of Polish society and the various options facing it. This is shown, for example, by the role of participants in programs like "100 questions for ...," "Interpolations," and "Shadow government." In them we can see a whole panorama of views, from the left to the right and conservative wings. So I consider unjustified the accusation that we aren't objective and that we don't take into account those forces that are important on the political scene, but we know that this sort of accusation is ascribed to any public television, and it is still stronger given the changes and the fluidity of the political structures.

[Stempien] "Wiadomości," the news program, is constantly subjected to public and political pressure.

[Dworak] A big part of the way "Wiadomości" is perceived comes from the fact that it is very popular. It's practically the only typical information program on Polish television, so it's hard to avoid criticism. All you can do is eliminate the program's monopoly by creating another channel of new information alongside it. Jacek Snopkiewicz, head of the information programs office, is very amenable to such an idea. He realizes that this would take some of the pressure off "Wiadomości" and allow him to operate in a more normal atmosphere. Increasing the number of information programs is one of the components of a broader plan for rebuilding TVP's organizational model. We started implementing it this June.

[Stempien] What's the philosophy underlying these changes?

[Dworak] Public television is obliged above all to be objective. Objectivity can be achieved through a clear separation between television and the world of politics. On the other hand, institutional forms should insure pluralism in public television. In our plan there's the idea that this form could consist of an oversight council or program council—the name isn't important—whose membership would take the complexity of society's interests fully into account. The existence of an independent, politically representative oversight council is anticipated by a rather well-known plan devised by Jakubowicz and Jędrzejewski. The radio committee's leadership accepts the plan's assumptions. I think that they are in the final version of the radio and television law, because the fundamental tenets of public television are structural bonds and daily independence from the often nervous rhythm of political life.

[Stempien] The fact that television is formally and practically a government institution is a carry-over from the past.

[Dworak] With complete conviction I would like to say that—paradoxically—during the transition period, this is a strong basis for independence. This independence is mainly formal today, after all. TVP does not serve the function of a government voice in terms of its programming. It's simply that nobody asks this of us. The government has only made the obvious and justified request of us that TVP consider its position in information and public affairs programs. Clearly, daily practice brings various dunning letters, but the various ministries and the Government Press Office are neither isolated from nor particularly active in this. It doesn't seem to me that we will ever avoid telephone calls from hot-headed politicians or bureaucrats—that's life—but the important thing is for the exchange of opinion between politicians and journalists to be on the level of a partnership. I can say completely responsibly that we have basically managed to achieve such a partnership. We won't see further implementation of this principle until television takes on the nature of a public institution and becomes independent.

[Stempien] The heads of the Committee on Radio and Television participated in the work of preparing the government draft of the communications law. What's in this draft?

[Dworak] The government draft of the law was sent to the Sejm. To make it short, it calls for real pluralism in broadcasting, because the changes coming about in our country make it necessary to get rid of the previous monopoly held by Polish Radio and Television. I'm not hiding the fact that we're very anxious for this to happen. Independent radio and television stations will create natural competition for us. It is true that this competition can sometimes be dangerous, but at the same time, these stations will relieve our institutions of the accusations aimed at us as a monopoly.

[Stempien] At the end of this May, the Sejm passed a law which gives political parties the right to broadcast their programs during the public affairs programming slot. What position has the TVP leadership taken vis-a-vis this law?

[Dworak] We see this law as a threat to TVP's postulated stance of independence and pluralism. I clearly don't deny political parties the right to TVP access or to broadcast a wide range of views, but it seems to me that a law on broadcasting one's own programs is something completely different, because television thereby loses the possibility of controlling its own time. It's difficult to predict to even what extent, because such time will be desired by both the parties and political groups, and surely the trade unions, the church, the associations, leagues, organizations, and so on. Please don't misunderstand me. I too think that everyone has the right to influence television, but not by independent programming. Let me repeat, because this is a sensitive issue: I believe that this influence should come mainly from the presence of representatives of the various political and



social groups in television's programming and supervisory leadership. This is the way most public television in Europe has gone, in England, the FRG, and France, for example.

Political parties can also have what is called "access time" on television, but it should be precisely defined, both during the period of the election campaign and during "normal times," if there are any. In democratic countries, access time is determined by the most varied possible, complicated mechanisms of public life. Paragraph 7 of the present law on parties includes a statement which is very imprecise and unclear. I am convinced that it will be the formal cause of many conflicts between parties—and there are dozens of them, and it wouldn't take much effort to create more—and the government and between radio and television.

The above-mentioned Sejm resolution's political aspect is not the only disturbing feature. The bill also takes into account the interest of the average television viewer, who may tire of the flood of words coming from the mouths of ambitious politicians.

[Stempien] Are you planning to saturate TVP with public interest programming? One hears two opposing opinions on this subject. Some people say that there are too few programs devoted to commentary on the news and explanation, and time is a hot thing. The second view is that people are tired of sociopolitical material and hungry for films and entertainment.

[Dworak] Both views are correct. I don't think that our television is all that bad. Except that it faces tremendous tasks. It is the only teacher on such a scale that is supposed to explain to people all the social and economic changes going on around them. And along the way it must itself change and learn. In terms of programming, for example, this will mean that we get rid of the old-fashioned public affairs programming and replace it with new, more attractive news programming. Television must be both wiser and more colorful.

#### **New Ursus Director Named**

90P20096E Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
26 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by E. Sz.: "New Director for Ursus"]

[Text] As a result of a secret ballot during the session of the workers' council of the Ursus Tractor Plants on 22 June, Henryk Szczygiel (master's in engineering) was named the new director of the enterprise for an undetermined period of time.

#### **Bialystok Mayor Named**

90P20096D Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
26 Jun 90 p 1

[Under rubric: "Yesterday...in Poland"]

[Text] The Bialystok City Council elected its mayor in the third round of votes. This is Lech Rutkowski, who

holds a master's in geodetic engineering and whose candidacy was presented by the Catholic Intellectuals Club.

## **YUGOSLAVIA**

### **Bosnian Future, Ethnic Issues Examined**

90BA0233A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
10 Jul 90 pp 22-23

[Article by Milan Jajcinovic: "What Will Happen to Bosnia?"]

[Text] There are several assumptions about what will happen to Bosnia: It can belong to Serbia, it can belong to Croatia, it can be divided between Serbia and Croatia, and it can even be independent, as it is now. It can be fused, along with the other peoples, into a "Yugoslav people." It can become Bosnia. What will Bosnia choose? And can it be what it chooses? The answers to these questions will show what Bosnia really is and what will happen to it.

On a hypothetical level, the Bosnian question can be easily solved. The possibilities for solving it have already been known for decades. At a recent meeting in Sarajevo on Bosnia and the Bosnian people—which was organized by the Bosnian Institute that is being established and the newspaper NASI DANI—Dr. Tomislav Ladan recalled them. Enumerating all those possibilities that could befall Bosnia, Ladan stated that in the final analysis, Bosnia still belonged to the Bosnians. By mentioning the assertion about Bosnians, we arrive right at the very heart of the Bosnian problem: who are the Bosnians? Are the Bosnians everyone who lives in Bosnia? Or are the Bosnians only the Bosnian Moslems? The name "Bosnian," along with its historical baggage, today also means a continuation of the search for a Bosnian identity. At a time when we are redefining what we call "Yugoslavia," that search is almost self-explanatory—because if there are no Bosnians, there can hardly be a Bosnia.

Old historical chronicles—Roman, Turkish, and Austrian—mention the name and adjective of "Bosnian." Dr. Muhsin Rizvic, a literary historian and a professor at Sarajevo University, states that the world of European civilization bears witness to Bosnia and Bosnians, from Constantine Porphyrogene, through Bartol Kasic and Evlija Celebija, up to recent times. Dr. Smail Balic, a former professor at several German universities (who turned up in Sarajevo after an absence of almost half a century) also found the adjective "Bosnian" in his searches through oriental literature. Prof. Balic claims that it was not just a regional designation for someone coming from Bosnia, but also a nationality reference. Emigrants from Bosnia in the Near East are not recognized under any other name but Bosnians, and this, in Balic's opinion, can indicate the designation of a people.

One can claim with certainty that for the Islamic peoples of the East, the designation "Bosnian" included, without exception, Moslems coming from Bosnia (and Sandzak), because they were the ones they met most often. The term Bosnian and the Bosnian people is not limited just to Turkish chronicles and Moslems, because it is also used by the Franciscans in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Austrian chronicles. In them, the name "Bosnian" does not include only the Islamic population of Bosnia. In fact, there is also a Franciscan and a Bey Bosnian people. Both of them have preserved throughout history the memory of Bosnia before the time of the Turks. One of them fits itself into the newly acquired spiritual identity, and the other preserves its original nature. Both the Franciscan and Bey Bosnian peoples, however, are aware of themselves and their roots. Neither one, however, extends that self-awareness to the Bosnian population (Moslems and Catholics), and their Bosnian nature remains self-denying.

### Split Identity

Demands are also appearing today that in defining the Bosnian people, it is necessary to rely on pre-Islamic Bosnia. Although the Islamic Bosnians had the same religion as the Turks, they preserved their South Slavic identity with respect to the foreigners of the same religion. That was not enough, however, to form their national identity completely. They were usually forced to "jump into someone else's identity," and to be a Serb or a Croat. The painful tragedy of the split identity was portrayed most clearly and strikingly in "The Dervish and Death," but also in his own life, by Mesa Selimovic, testifying to how these people feel themselves to be the "most confused people in the world: History did not play such a joke on anyone else as it did on us. Until yesterday, we were what we want to forget today; but we did not become anything else. We stopped halfway, dumbfounded. We cannot go anywhere anymore. We have torn ourselves away, but we are not accepted, like a small backwater that a flood has separated from its mother river; it has no current or outlet anymore, and it is too small to be a lake, but too large to be absorbed by the earth. With a vague memory of shame because of our origin, and guilt because of our apostasy, we do not want to look backward, but we do not have anywhere to look ahead to. That is why we are marking time, in the fear of any solution at all. We are scorned by our brethren and newcomers, and we defend ourselves with pride and hatred. We wanted to preserve ourselves, and so we lost ourselves so that we no longer even know what we are."

The creator of the unforgettable "The Dervish and Death" tried to get rid of his existential awkwardness by declaring himself to be a Serb. Savfet-beg Basagic, Musa Cazim Catim, and Mak Dizdar felt themselves to be Croats. Many Moslem intellectuals felt the full tragedy and limitation of the dilemma facing them (usually not of their own will). Such choices were particularly painful for many of them, as were their wanderings. Once they were Croats, another time they were Serbs, and in fact they were usually neither the one nor the other. Bey,

partisan, and lyricist Skender Kulenovic was certainly about to testify about what a misfortune this was.

Dr. Ivo Banac, in his book "The National Question in Yugoslavia," states that in the 1920 elections, 15 deputies from the Yugoslav Moslem Organization (JMO) declared themselves to be Croats. Two declared themselves to be Serbs. Five of them did not choose any nationality at all, while one declared himself to be a Bosnian. Prof. Banac also writes that in the next elections, all of the JMO representatives (17 of them) declared themselves to be Croats, except for the party's president, Dr. Mehmed Spaho. It is interesting that Spaho, according to Banac, declared himself to be a Serb in his student days, and later did not declare himself to be either a Serb or a Croat, while one of his brothers declared himself a Croat, and the other a Serb. Twenty or so years later, after World War II, the leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina of Moslem origin chose a completely different national identity. Prof. Smail Balic claims that after the war, because they did not have their own national name, 61.5 percent of the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (of Moslem origin) declared themselves to be Serbs, 16 percent declared themselves to be Croats, and 12 percent did not choose a nationality, while eight percent declared themselves to be Yugoslavs.

### Moslem Self-Awareness

The fact of the national declarations of the JMO leadership was presented at the Sarejevo meeting by Dr. Branko Horvat (who also maintains that the Bosnian people should encompass both the Bosnian Serbs and Croats). Adil Zulfikarpasic, a former political emigre and now a Swiss businessman and proponent of Bosnianism as the national identity of Bosnian Moslems, reacted to Horvat's statement. He said that he had also heard such statements earlier, and that he had therefore asked Dr. Kosta CAVOSKI to dig around in the Belgrade archives along with his colleagues and find out whether the fact cited by Horvat (Horvat would refer Zulfikarpasic to Banac) was correct or not. CAVOSKI informed him that during the entire existence of various sessions of the assembly in old Yugoslavia, there had not been any declaration of nationality by the assembly deputies. Zulfikarpasic thought that Banac's fact was derived from a book by Svetozar Pribecevic, "The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar," because he states that of the 24 JMO deputies, 19 of them declared themselves to be Croats, although Prof. Banac cites as his source a book by Muhamed Hadzizahic, "From Tradition to Identity: Genesis of the National Question of the Bosnian Moslems."

In contrast to Prof. Horvat (and several others), who viewed the Bosnian people in an integral manner, Adil Zulfikarpasic (and many others) reduce it to only the present Moslems. The advocates of Bosnianism as the national identity of the Bosnian Moslems claim that their present name has been imposed on them by a political directive, and that a religious designation

cannot become a national one. They want to call themselves Bosnians, and extend that name to all Moslems. There is no doubt of this at all, because the very invitation to the Sarajevo symposium says that "the issue of Bosnianism as the national identity of Bosnian Moslems" follows, and that "the problems associated with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnianism as the national identity of Bosnian Moslems is illuminated from several aspects." It is obvious that the current Yugoslav political upheaval has led to the political organization of Bosnian Moslems (the Democratic Action Party [SDA]), and national "fulfillment," and in connection with this, to the new national name becoming a current topic.

Adil Zulfikarpasic, a successful businessman from a bey's family, obviously has enough willpower and money to persist in attempting to replace one national name for some Bosnians with another one. When he talks about Bosnians, he is thinking of the present Moslems. This is consequently different from the attempt at one time by Benjamin Kallay, under Austria-Hungary, who advocated the creation of Bosnianism as a separate Bosnian nationality in order to defend against the irredentist national movements of Serbs and Croats. Zulfikarpasic is of the opinion that the present Moslem name is a religious and not a national one (although, for example, the religious and national name for Jews is the same!), and that a people without a name is vulnerable to encroachment. That is why the recent speech in Sarajevo by Academician Dalibor Brozovic (also Sarajlija, by birth), a member of the Croatian Presidency, was met with particular attention.

Brozovic denied all alleged pretensions of the present Croatian government to Bosnia and Herzegovina, stating that Croatia recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and equal state, and "did not have any aspirations to it, no matter how many lies had been told about that in certain newspapers." So that his words would not be interpreted as his personal position, Brozovic emphasized that he was also speaking as a representative of the Croatian republic. He asserted that any partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, any new Cvetkovic-Macek agreement, was out of the question. He also said, however, that if "in trouble, Bosnia would be defended as a whole, because that was also a vital interest for Croatia." Why? "It is sufficient," Brozovic said, "to look at a map to see that without Croatia, Bosnia is a closed can, and Croatia without Bosnia is a dry roll; and there is no meal there for anyone." Brozovic consequently cited the geographic and historical ties between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and commented that this association was not directed against any third party, "neither against Serbs nor against Serbia, and especially not against the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia."

At a time when national states are crystallizing in Yugoslavia and it is obvious that a new agreement on a new community is coming up, Adil Zulfikarpasic, Dr. Muhamed Filipovic (the founder of the "Bosnian spirit"), and Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of the SDA, are

trying to strengthen Moslem self-awareness, because what Bosnia will be like and what happens to it will depend a great deal upon the present Moslems and perhaps the future Bosnians. Regardless of what they are called, the Bosnian Moslems are the majority population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and vitally interested in preserving Bosnian statehood—not because they are in the majority, but because Bosnia-Herzegovina is their only homeland. Both the Serbs and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are in a more favorable position in that respect. At least they have the illusion of security in relying on their parent nation. The Moslems have just one Bosnia. As Prof. Esad Cemic said, if Bosnia were in jeopardy, that would even biologically jeopardize the Moslems, "because whoever challenges the Moslems' homeland is challenging them."

#### Croatian-Moslem Ties

Today, 81.5 percent of all Yugoslav Moslems live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, 76 percent of all Serbs live in Serbia, and 70 percent of all Croats in Croatia. It is precisely that fact which Prof. Cemic cites in support of his assertion about Bosnia as a condition for Moslem existence. That does not mean, however, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should become a Moslem national state (the most fortunate thing would be for it to be a state of sovereign citizens). In fact, 17 percent of all Croats and 16 percent of all Serbs live in it. And as far as the very future name of the Moslem nation is concerned, Prof. Cemic maintains that Bosnianism is obsolete as an ethnic category, and that it would be received with suspicion by a large number of Moslems; "people would become unaccustomed to what they had just become used to recently." After all, at the level of empirical awareness there is virtually no difference between religion and the nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such an attempt could also weaken the SDA's position in the upcoming elections to some extent, because the most hard-line advocate of a new national name, Adil Zulfikarpasic, is identified with the activity of that party.

All analysts of Bosnian political life agree on the assessment that the SDA should win the elections. The party is oriented toward Moslems, and has Moslem characteristics. It is also claimed that it has Croatian backing. Even the president of what was formerly the only party, Dr. Nijaz Durakovic, is talking about a possible coalition between the SDA and the Croatian Democratic Community (which is still unregistered in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and the fear of their possible majority tyranny over the Serbs in Bosnia. Is that really true, however, and are the Moslem-Croatian ties quite so strong? Admittedly, among the Moslems there have always been people who considered themselves Croats of the Islamic faith, or just Croats, if they were atheists. There are a considerable number of people abroad who feel that way. The best known are Kerim Reis, director of the Croatian Islamic Center in Toronto, who is a close colleague of Dr. Mate Mestrovic. Such beliefs, however, are an exception, and not the rule.



At one time, Drazen Budisa, president of the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance stated at a Zagreb forum that Moslems had a right to be what they wanted and what they felt themselves to be, but that he appreciated it if one of them declared himself to be a Croat. Something similar was recently said in Sarajevo by Dr. Dalibor Brozovic, who stated, "As a Croat, I refuse to seek to have Moslems integrated into the Croatian nation. I am aware of the illusory nature of such an attempt, and I do not want to invest in something that is hopeless; but if some Moslem in some way becomes a Croat, that's all right. If you want to, great, and if not, fine! Aside from this, Croatian policy will not fall into the trap offered, as Bulgarian policy did by not recognizing the Macedonian nation. And, furthermore, the unity of Croats and Moslems is worth less than is hoped in Zagreb or feared in Belgrade." At any rate, the rare individuals who declare themselves to be Croats or Serbs very easily become "national renegades." The case of Mesa Selimovic is well known, as is the case of Dr. Esad Cemic, who declared himself to be a Croat. If one can judge by Dr. Muhamed Filipovic's gesture, who gets up from the table of the working presidency when Prof. Cemic sits down at it, then some people have not yet forgiven him for declaring himself a Croat.

Bosnia is not flat and as simple as it sometimes seems to some people. The conclusion of the process of Moslem national articulation is taking place there in broad daylight. It is possible that the present Moslems may change their name and become Bosnians. It is hardly possible, however—in fact, impossible—for the Bosnian Serbs and Croats to become Bosnians in that sense. In the present era of the final formation of national states, the former imposed trinational Bosnian model, based on the omnipotence of one party, is collapsing. Together with its collapse, there is a growing fear that Bosnia-Herzegovina will also collapse. The most important thing for Bosnia (and not just for it) is that it be a state for all its citizens, and that it create, first of all, a proportional electoral system, and then a bicameral system that would ensure civil and national sovereignty. It seems, however, that for the time being that is unlikely, just as it is even less likely that all of the inhabitants of Bosnia will become Bosnians. All other possibilities will be against Bosnia. That is why there is no real answer to the question, "What will happen to Bosnia?" The Moslems are for it. The Croats are definitely in the minority, and the Serbs are mostly keeping quiet. Really—what will happen to Bosnia?

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Fate of Soviet Troops in GDR Discussed

90GE0222A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
No 29, 16 Jul 90 pp 26-27

[Unattributed article: "That Will Be a Tightrope Walk"]

[Text] Their pay has lately been in West-marks. Western goods, that is to say the temptations of capitalism, are being offered in the stores at their barracks. And if they have courage enough, they could have a grand time in West Berlin's KaDeWe [department store] or buy a used car in Luebeck: no border and no border controls restrain them any longer, the 363,000 soldiers of the Soviet Army in the GDR.

The revolution in the GDR, influenced by the ideas of their own President Gorbachev, has stripped the Soviet soldiers stationed in the GDR of their right to be there. Against whom are they to protect a state, which is turning the ideology of the class enemy into its own credo? Worse yet: What are they doing in a country that is bent on relinquishing its own existence in a few months and joining its erstwhile enemy?

In the 46th year after the end of the war, a new era has already begun. The Soviets, winners of World War II, are realizing that they can no longer keep under occupation the eastern part of that country which declared war on them 49 years ago. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, with the unification of Germany, a new political system which demands new rules is arising.

The details of these rules are open. When and—above all—under what conditions will the Soviets withdraw their troops from Germany?

Germans and Germans, Soviets and Westerners have been seeking an answer for weeks. They meet at two-party, "two-plus-four" or real summit conferences. And usually the Western standpoint is quite clear-cut: The united Germany should belong to NATO. At any rate, there is major agreement that alliance troops should not cross the old alliance boundary of the Elbe.

The Soviets are having a harder time with their counterposition. To be sure, they appear ready for a gradual departure of their "Western Group," but want guarantees against German expansion efforts. They want—and perhaps also need—the security that a withdrawal of their troops stationed in the far west will cause them neither political nor military damage.

At the CPSU party congress in Moscow, it was evident time and again that the Soviet military has not gotten as far as their own politicians. It is all going too fast for them; the enemy image is deeply ingrained. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had to suffer the accusation by General Ivan Mikulin, that the diplomats are "looking through rose-colored glasses," he warned "against hasty steps."

The "positive changes in the world," as the party congress summed it up in a document on military reform, are not yet irreversible: "The military danger for the USSR continues." Gorbachev has little room to maneuver in this area during the talks that began last weekend with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

"This will be a tightrope walk," commented one German diplomat in Moscow, after Gorbachev's military adviser, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev had warned that a combined Germany in the Western alliance would be "absolutely unacceptable."

The generals barely approved the withdrawal of their soldiers from Hungary and Czechoslovakia; a withdrawal from Germany, conquered with heavy sacrifices in 1945, is regarded by them as a defeat, or even a disgrace.

Kohl and Genscher must make it clear in Moscow that a unified Germany poses no danger for the Soviet Union. The intent is to replace the previous confrontation with political, military and economic cooperation, to reduce the Bundeswehr from the present 495,000 to 400,000, perhaps even 320,000, soldiers and to shorten conscription from 15 to 12 months.

It goes without saying, argued Carl-Christian von Braunmühl, a psychotherapist and adviser to GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel, that after the unification there must be "no second Versailles" for Germany. Germany must enjoy full sovereignty without any restrictions and freely choose what alliance to belong to. "But there also must be no Versailles for the Soviet Union."

Politicians in East Germany, since 1945 more familiar than their West German colleagues with the Russian mentality, are pleading for a longer transition phase. The Soviet Union needs time to adapt to the new situation.

A shrinking of the German forces—Shevardnadze proposed 200,000 to 250,000 men—would definitely be to the Kremlin's liking. Shevardnadze told the Soviet military officers that the future all-German Army would "be smaller than the Bundeswehr today." But a withdrawal of Soviet troops from what is still the GDR would, in the opinion of the Soviet generals, upset the security framework in Europe.

The Soviet Union would have to clear out its western approaches and thus give up a doctrine deeply rooted since the end of World War II: The next war, if it comes, must not be fought on Russian soil.

Shevardnadze promised the criticizing generals that the government would not approve a solution at the "two-plus-four" talks, the negotiations between the two German states and the four victorious powers, which conflicts with Soviet security interests.

In principle, the Soviet government now also favors a withdrawal of its troops over the next 5 years, but wants to do so at a high cost: The Germans are not only to

finance the support of the Soviet soldiers—DM1.25 billion for the second half of 1990—but to buy back the 1,000 barracks, airports and exercise fields confiscated and used without compensation since 1945. And it would be up to the Germans to remedy the enormous environmental harm caused to GDR territory.

As yet, neither Gorbachev nor his generals know how to house the soldiers stationed in the GDR and what they are to do with the tens of thousands of officers and their families. A Soviet general stationed in the GDR says: "We cannot be interested in letting our soldiers camp out for any length of time at a construction site for capitalism." So maybe there will be quick withdrawal after all?

Despite all the optimistic prognoses in Bonn, the issue of German alliance membership could still become a stumbling block on the way toward rapid unity. The Soviet Union can still at any time fall back on the four-power declaration, in which the victors of World War II retain for themselves all rights regarding "Germany as a whole."

The Soviet chief of the General Staff, Mikhail Moiseyev, like Marshal Akhromeyev a supporter of Gorbachev's policies, can "imagine a great deal," he recently assured German visitors, but not a combined Germany that belongs entirely to NATO and in whose western part allied troops continue to be stationed, while the Soviets have to withdraw to the east. To the question of how long Soviet soldiers should remain in Germany, Moiseyev replied with military brevity: "As long as there are U.S. troops in the FRG."

Ultimately, he said, the GDR has entered into obligations under the Warsaw Pact which it must keep as long as the military alliances have not been replaced with a new European security system. But the general is wrong in that.

When signing the Warsaw Pact, then GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl in 1955 added a reservation to the protocol: "In signing the present treaty... the government of the GDR assumes that a reunited Germany will be free of the obligations which were undertaken by a part of Germany in military treaties and agreements concluded before reunification."

## POLAND

### Defense Minister on Need for Vigilance on Eastern Border

90P20087A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No-30, 28 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of National Defense, by Ewa Lukasiewicz, excerpted from *DZIENNIK LODZKI* 11 Jul 90, under rubric "Opinions"; place and date not given]

[Text] [Lukasiewicz] Which border should be more steadfastly defended today? The Premier let it be understood that in the future one must also pay careful attention to the East....

[Kolodziejczyk] First of all, the border which will be under the greatest threat must be defended. We cannot foresee what will further become of the Soviet Union, if she were to go to pieces. For example, the Lithuanians are very much loved by us, but reciprocity is rather not evident over history, to say nothing of the Ukraine. This is, however, a threat to the subsequent plan. Because, prior to this, they organize their own frameworks of nationhood and some kind of army.... This is still a distant matter, but we cannot not think about this already today. But, with the Germans, we have particular experiences, so that while today Poland has guarantees, here also vigilance is necessary.

[Lukasiewicz] One hears that in 1980, during the "Tarcza-80" maneuvers, you contributed to blocking entry to ships of the Soviet fleet...

[Kolodziejczyk] In all legends there is a little bit of truth, but I do not want to get in to that.

### Polish-Swedish Delegation Discusses Political, Defense Doctrine

90P20088A Warsaw *TRYBUNA* in Polish 26 Jun 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Polish-Swedish Maneuvers"]

[Text] The members of the Sejm Commission for National Defense met with representatives of the National Defense Commission of the Swedish Parliament. The political-defense doctrine of both countries was discussed. The Swedes were interested in the future of the Warsaw Pact. "Poland is in favor of the evolutionary model," stated deputy Jerzy Golaczynski, "in contrast to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, who, in the coming year, want to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. We are awaiting the founding of a general European system of security, which would take the place of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In Western Europe quite a few countries, other than the U.S., possess atomic weapons, and in the East, only the Soviet Union does. A change in the relation of powers is therefore the goal, but on a scale of the whole continent."

General Zenon Kulaga added that the new Polish military doctrine is exclusively defensive in nature. In the General Staff, war games are conducted solely on maps, where Poland fights her enemy between the Vistula and the Bug and the aggressor has similar planes and tanks. In reversing the problem, one asks, from whom do the Swedes want to defend themselves? The guests responded that neutrality plays the fundamental role. They are, however, observing the NATO-Warsaw Pact talks. The special committee that was set up has not yet worked out the defensive strategy. Its work is foreseen to last for the next five years.



**Unit Responsible for Safeguarding Embassies,  
Government Profiled**

90EP0721A Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish  
No 27, 7 Jul 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Gen. Bde. Edward Wejner, commander of the NJW [Nadwisławska Military Unit], Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Ryszard Czerniawski; place and date not given: "They Maintain and Protect"]

[Text] [Czerniawski] General Wejner, the army is to defend us against external enemies, and the police are to keep order within the country. So what tasks fall to the military units you command, those not under the Ministry of National Defense but the Ministry of Internal Affairs? Isn't this similar to what is known as internal export?

[Wejner] Not at all. After all, the army's tasks are not limited, as you suggest, to defending the country against outside enemies. In many countries, including Central Europe, there are separate military units not under the defense ministry. There are, of course, various organizational formats, but armies like the Nadwisławska Military Unit are established in order to avoid involving the army in domestic matters.

[Czerniawski] Which means for what? Strictly speaking, the soldiers with the navy-rimmed caps can usually be seen as guards, whether in front of the Belweder or protecting what seems to be military ground, but is actually a recreation center for the Office of the Council of Ministers. Are these subunits to protect the power elite?

[Wejner] To a certain extent, yes. We protect and safeguard the operation of installations designated for top government bodies. The way it's divided up, the BOR (Biuro Ochrony Rzadu [Office of Government Protection]) handles the direct personal protection of people in top positions and is responsible for the internal security of installations in which these bodies are located, while we guard the outside. So, for example, the Belweder, mentioned above, is guarded by several dozen soldiers, and there are a bit fewer at the famous center in Arłamowa. The division of tasks between the BOR and us is not actually all that clear, because we have specialists who handle the monitoring of installations assigned to us in terms of security too (the possibility of planting explosives or radio active material, for example). In this respect, we also provide security during various sorts of state functions or when there are delegations of foreign visitors. It's no secret that such a delegation's arrival route or the meeting place of state dignitaries, whether local or foreign, is examined in great detail for security purposes. We are also called upon to perform other tasks of this sort. Following an anonymous phone tip that a bomb had been planted at the bank at Plac Powstancow in Warsaw, it was specialists from the Nadwisławska Military Unit who checked the entire building in minute detail. Fortunately, they didn't find anything. The same was true of a false alarm at Okęcie Airport.

[Czerniawski] Insofar as I know, your subordinates not only protect members of the government but also drive them around.

[Wejner] Yes, they do. The NJW flying group includes two squadrons with a total of 24 Mi-8 helicopters, two of them outfitted as special passenger carriers. These are among the safest helicopters in the world.

[Czerniawski] Who may use them?

[Wejner] There are no rigid restrictions about this. Of course, they are intended first of all for members of the government, but deputy ministers, department directors, and other bureaucrats can make use of them too, with the approval of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The police also use these helicopters, because they don't have any of their own, and special mail is carried in them, for example. Our services are free to these people, but our helicopters can also be rented by civil institutions. For example, banks often use them to carry money. An Mi-8 costs nearly half a million zlotys per flight hour, but it's worth it, especially when you can put three tons of money in one of these helicopters. We recently had four squadrons of helicopters, not two, and we are selling the rest. One company bought five helicopters for 12 billion zlotys.

[Czerniawski] I understand that the activity of the Nadwisławska Military Unit for members of the state government applies not only in peace time but also includes preparations in the event of war. Do your soldiers maintain antinuclear shelters designated for government officials?

[Wejner] Yes, the Department of Security of Special Installations (Oddział Zabezpieczenia Obiektow Specjalnych) handles this. Insofar as antinuclear shelters, as you put it, are concerned, these are simply solid underground structures which have no luxuries but are equipped with everything that might be necessary, from vehicles, water, filter stations, and generator plants to beds, sheets, towels, and food rations. They are constructed to insure the security of the people in them and to make it possible for them to run the country.

[Czerniawski] Will they hold up under a rocket attack?

[Wejner] That's what they were built and equipped for.

[Czerniawski] Who are they for?

[Wejner] At the moment, it's hard for me to say exactly, because organizational changes are occurring, but it's our job to maintain these installations in proper technical condition. At any rate, we're talking here about the president, the premier, and some members of the government and the parliament, among others. Up until recently, the list also included all the members of the Politburo and some secretaries of the PZPR Central Committee.

[Czerniawski] How many places have been prepared in the shelters?

[Wejner] A few dozen.

[Czerniawski] But your soldiers handle more than just such shelters, don't they?

[Wejner] Alongside the above-mentioned Department of Security of Special Installations, the NJW also has a company of construction engineers. They handle remodeling, first of all, but insofar as construction is concerned, it's mainly the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] hospital on Komarowa Street in Warsaw.

[Czerniawski] And the subdivision constructed for the Office of the Council of Ministers in Wilanow?

[Wejner] That's not us.

[Czerniawski] But what about the private houses which I heard had been built by soldiers, as part of training of course?

[Wejner] There's a regulation permitting soldiers to be delegated, for a fee, to ministry housing cooperatives putting up houses for personnel, but the price set for these services is so high that it really doesn't pay. On the other hand, if a professional military man exploited soldiers, especially his own subordinates, on his own building project, then of course he would pay a higher rate, in addition to suffering disciplinary penalties.

[Czerniawski] Are government telephones also your domain?

[Wejner] To a certain extent. There are several MSW people working at phone company headquarters, but we all dig the ditches and lay down the lines together. Within the framework of military training too, NJW laid civilian lines and installed telephones at General Kiszczak's request in Warsaw, Krakow, Katowice, and Chorzow, more than 34,000 telephones in all. Inasmuch as on the training ground they would also be digging ditches and laying lines—although it seems simple, it isn't—merely to put the dirt back in the holes afterwards, it seemed better to have some real benefit of it all.

The communications unit which handles this is actually a far smaller unit with a clear training nature to it. In addition, the unit's tasks include providing field communications whenever the national leadership is outside their fixed headquarters and protecting the radio center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and communications with the Polish Republic's diplomatic branches.

[Czerniawski] And who's in charge of protecting Polish embassies and consulates?

[Wejner] These are specialists taken from among our professional military people. After appropriate training with us and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you can find them in the embassies in certain countries.

[Czerniawski] How many Polish diplomatic facilities have this sort of special protection?

[Wejner] Nineteen. In those countries where the threat is the greatest.

[Czerniawski] But let's get back to our country. Concretely, in the Beskid Mountains, where a motorized unit pastures cows, raises pigs, cultivates the fields. Doesn't the army really have anything else to do?

[Wejner] All of us in the military are against it. Minister Kiszczak has asked one ministry of agriculture after another to take over the 4,000 hectares which the army is now working, but not one of them has agreed. Of course, we could just pull out, but we have no assurance that this enormous resource would not be wasted, as happened at the beginning of the 1980's when the farm was turned over to Igloopol. There are barns for more than 3,000 cows, sheep sheds for more than 2,000 sheep, and pig sties for nearly a thousand hogs, grain storehouses, fodder-mixing facilities, land under cultivation, and farm equipment. All this came from the 1970's, when a plan was dreamed up to raise livestock there and import feed from the United States and Canada.

The army took it over, because it had to, and it's doing what it can. In the end, more than 1,000 tons of meat is being supplied to nearby voivodships, and that's not so little. An average of 400 soldiers are working there. These are mainly farmers, volunteers from the basic service. We'd be glad to turn the Army Farm [Wojskowe Gospodarstwo Rolne] over to civilians, except that nobody wants it.

[Czerniawski] You talked about the number of soldiers in the Beskid Mountains. But how many altogether are in the Nadwislanska Military Unit? Is it a military secret?

[Wejner] No, NJW's total personnel is not much over 9,000 soldiers and officers, including nearly 7,000 soldiers in basic service. This figure is nearly 1,000 staff and soldiers less than last year. General Kiszczak ordered cuts: one brigade, an independent battalion, and the flying unit was reduced from four squadrons to two. There were also plans to cut the motorized unit which serves the farm in the Bieszczad Mountains, but this didn't come about, for the reasons I already mentioned. There will also be further reductions this year.

[Czerniawski] So what else about the Nadwislanska Military Unit? The law recently passed concerning the Minister of Internal Affairs' office doesn't mention any unit names, but it says military units may—but they don't have to be—subordinated to the Minister of Internal Affairs, if their tasks include protecting people in positions of state leadership or members of foreign diplomatic corps, or protecting and safeguarding the functioning of installations and facilities which serve top bodies of the government and its administration.

[Wejner] Everything is possible. At the moment new organizational structures are being developed. Whether or not they will have room for units like those presently in the NJW is hard for me to say.

[Czerniawski] Thank you for the interview.

### **Procedures for Protection of Secret Documents Outlined**

90EP0739A Warsaw ZOLNIERZ

RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 10 Jul 90 p 6

[Article by Lt. Col. Marek Ryszkowski, General Staff of the Polish Army: "Ignorantia Iuris Nocet"]

[Text] Ignorance of the law is damaging; it is also no release from responsibility for violators. Thus, an elementary knowledge of the law, especially in the area of protecting secrets, is essential for soldiers and military employees. Those responsible for the protection of secrets in units and military institutions (commanders, heads, commandants, directors) and the organizers of the protection of secrets in these organizational units of the Ministry of National Defense (chiefs of staff or officers designated by orders in units where there is no chief of staff) should be distinguished by above average knowledge of the law in this area.

The national and ministry normative and legal base on the protection of secrets is fairly broad; it consists of several laws and many executive regulations. Below, selected laws and decrees applying to soldiers and military employees and commanders on the protection of secrets are discussed in a condensed manner.

The law of 14 December 1982 on the protection of professional and state secrets is the basic normative act that forms the foundation for all actions associated with the protection of secrets. Article 5 of the act states that maintaining secrets is the obligation of each individual who is in possession of them regardless of his position, kind or place of work, or the nature of his work relationship. Maintaining secrets is required both as long as the work relationship is in force and after it ceases.

Information, especially state secrets, may be provided to an individual who has received authorized access to such information. Permission may be given to an individual who is a Polish citizen and gives guarantees to protect the secrets. An employee can be given access exclusively to that secret information which is part of the duties he performs. A foreigner may be given secret information only when the development, conclusion, or execution of international agreements requires it.

Article 21 of the law states that the minister of national defense defines for the organization under him the principles for the protection of secrets, and the organization, control, and procedures for managing secret information, including transfer, reception, and conveyance of documents.

The above article forms the legal foundation for decree No. 29 of the Ministry of National Defense of 27 May 1983 on the protection of state and professional secrets

in the Ministry of National Defense. The decree unambiguously sets out that commanders (heads, commandants, directors) of organizational units of the Ministry of National Defense are responsible for the protection of state and professional secrets in the organizational units under them and for observing the binding regulations in this area. The direct organizer of the protection of state and professional secrets in organizational units is the chief of staff, and if this position does not exist, the commander (head, commandant, director) or the individual designated by him. The basic forms of supervision on the protection of state and professional secrets are the auditing, analysis, and evaluation of their management made by the commanders (heads, commandants, directors) and of their collegial bodies and by all sorts of audit and inspection bodies.

The decree also emphasizes that protection of secrets is the basic obligation of each soldier and military employee. It includes the entire set of procedures to prevent the disclosure of secret information, in particular by: appropriately classifying secret information and marking the documents containing such information with the appropriate secrecy indication; appropriately securing documents during the development, processing, and storing, transferring, sending, conveying or destroying them; securing the area, facilities, and rooms against reconnaissance and penetration by unauthorized individuals; appropriately using the technical means of communication; observing the established procedures in chancellery work and in other record keeping units, in computer systems, in scientific information, in research and development work and in design and construction work, in secret production and in publishing.

Other military normative documents in this area require commanders (heads, commandants, directors) at all levels of command and management to develop soldiers' and employees' sense of responsibility for the protection of secrets, uncovering threats from the intelligence services of foreign states, enhancing the abilities of subordinates to counteract the reconnaissance by military forces, eliminating causes for the loss of control of secret equipment, and documents; and sharpening disciplinary practices against violators of the regulations on the protection of secrets. These documents also require all supervisors to evaluate in detail their functional personnel responsible for the organization of the protection of secrets in the subordinate institutions, staffs, and military units and strictly to apply the principles of protection of secrets in daily professional and social activities. The evaluation of the observation of the regulations on the protection of secrets in publications by particular military editorial staffs at least once a year is the obligation of the commanders of the military districts and of the branches of the armed forces and the heads of the headquarter offices of the Ministry of National Defense that are the publishers of military periodicals.

Military bodies, as well as other state bodies, are obligated to provide the press with information on their



activities. A refusal to provide information can be given only to protect state and professional secrets and other secrets protected by law (medical records, for example). On the demand of the editor in chief a refusal should be provided to the concerned editorial offices in written form before the defined deadline. The refusal should contain the designation of the bodies, organizational units, or individual from which it comes, the date issued, the editorial offices it concerns, the indication of the information which it concerns, and the reason for the refusal. A refusal can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court before the established deadline. Each citizen, in accord with the principles of freedom of speech, can provide the press with information. No one can be exposed to prejudice or accusation for providing information to the press if he has acted within the bounds established by law. Hindering the press in the collection of critical materials or muting criticisms in any other manner is not permitted. Supervisors of these units, their assistants, press spokesmen, or other authorized individuals are required to provide information in the name of organizational units of the Ministry of National Defense within the bounds of the duties assigned to them. The heads of the above mentioned units are required to make it possible for journalists to make contact with the soldiers or military employees under them and to freely collect information and opinions among them. A journalist cannot refuse anyone providing an interview the right to authorize the quoted statements if they have not been published previously. A journalist cannot publish information if the individual who provided it has reserved it because of professional or occupational secrecy. The editor in chief is responsible for the contents of materials published by his editorial staff within the bounds defined by the appropriate regulations. If the editor in chief gains immunity, he is obligated to indicate the journalist who bears the above mentioned responsibility. General principles are applied for violations of the law caused by press publication unless the press law provides otherwise.

In cases of violation by press publication, court jurisdiction is established by the location of the editorial offices, then by the publisher, and, if the latter is unknown or is abroad, by the place of publication or distribution of the press publication. If proceedings have been initiated in several courts, the court that first initiated proceedings has jurisdiction.

Disclosing state secrets, for example, by losing a document in the classification "secret," is a crime prosecuted by the state and an extraordinary accident. Each such accident causes very unpleasant consequences, especially for the individual who commits it. Sometimes, the reason for disclosing the secret is talking too much, not observing the principles for conducting radio transmissions, transferring secret information over unsecured means of communication, not observing the principles for recording and processing data in computer systems, etc. Usually these disclosures result from a lack of

knowledge regulating these areas of military operations, seldom, their conscious violation.

### **Special Commission Reviews Cases of Alleged Wrongful Dismissal**

90EP0729A Warsaw ZOLNIERZ  
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 5 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Marian Stuglik, deputy chief of the Department of Personnel, Ministry of National Defense, by PAP [Polish Press Agency]; place and date not given: "Compensation for Soldiers Dismissed for Convictions"]

[Text] A special commission has been operating since the beginning of this year at the Department of Personnel, Ministry of National Defense, to review complaints which former professional soldiers and reservists have lodged in connection with injustices committed between 1980 and 1989 stemming from their political or union activity or religious convictions. The commission is the result of a decision made by the head of the ministry.

Col. Marian Stuglik, Deputy Chief of the Department of Personnel, discussed the results of the commission's work with a PAP journalist.

It was high time, because back this January a commission began to review cases submitted by former professional soldiers which fall under the "Law for Restoration of Employee Rights." The basic issue here is to establish the actual reasons behind service discharges, because usually the official basis has met the conditions which the respective legal and ministry regulations call for, and sometimes doubt remains even after an in-depth analysis has been made of the documents and materials. Sometimes a personal meeting is needed. It happens on occasion that some people try to blame their lack of success in the service on injustices they have suffered for their convictions. The commission adopts the principle of resolving any doubt in favor of the interested party.

The commission has broad jurisdiction in proposing to the Minister of National Defense various forms of reparation for injustices suffered from the ministry. This is based on an application for return to professional military service. The applicants must meet the legal conditions: be under 60 years of age and have a statement from the military medical commission that they are fit for professional duty. If these conditions are not met, the interested party receives a personal letter from the Minister of National Defense and a lump sum as financial settlement. This does not include any legal obligation.

Where possible, various sorts of financial compensation are also used within the existing legal framework, as for example, appropriately adjusting payments to compensate for a personnel decision which deprived the person of a rank or punished him by discharging him from professional military service, or by releasing him and altering the date of transfer to the reserves or retirement, once the basis is changed.

In keeping with the "Law for Restoration of Employee Rights," the deadline for filing complaints ran out this 30 June. Up to the present time, 126 cases have been reviewed, 113 filed personally and 13 officially. As of 1 June, 17 officers and one noncommissioned officer have been returned to service. Four soldiers are waiting for the formalities related to their return to service to be completed, and 20 are waiting for a decision by the military medical commission.

Because of age or health, several dozen people who suffered injustice will be compensated in some other way. Some of them, like some of the people returned to service, have been nominated for higher ranks. In 41 cases the commission found the applicants' accusations and complaints to be groundless. The commission decision is subject to appeal to the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy.

## HUNGARY

### World Bank Grants \$100 Million Loan for Agricultural Purposes

25000762D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
30 Jun 90 p 5

[Hungarian Telegraph Agency report and article by Peter Sereny: "\$100 Million for Agriculture"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Based on an agreement signed in Washington Friday [29 Jun] the World Bank is granting credit to Hungary to finance its agricultural modernization program. Backed by a guarantee of the Hungarian state, the Hungarian National Bank receives a \$100 million loan from the World Bank, repayable within 15 years. Within that term there is a five-year grace period. The interest rate is variable, adjusted semiannually to the cost of credit available to the World Bank. (The present interest rate is 7.75 percent.)

Ministry of Agriculture administrative State Secretary Dr. Endre Mandy signed the agreement for the Hungarian side on Friday in Washington. The agreement is a result of several months of negotiations. Dr. Mandy issued a statement to the NEPSZABADSAG reporter.

"This, officially called an 'integrated agricultural export-program-agreement,' opens an opportunity to finance the production, transportation, buying up, storage, processing, and sale of agricultural products that can be exported, as well as of related services," the State Secretary said. As an example he mentioned the fact that in a given situation financing may also apply to the food industry.

Conditions include a commitment to develop a modern mortgage system. This will provide security for the banks that will transmit the World Bank loan.

Interested persons may compete for loans from the World Bank credit at the nine Hungarian financial institutions which participate in the program. The nine banks are: Hungarian Credit Bank, National Commercial and Credit Bank, Budapest Bank, the National Saving Bank, Agrobank, General Entrepreneurial Bank, Industrial Development Bank, Inter-Europa Bank, and Mezőbank. Quite naturally, as is the practice anywhere in the world, these banks will evaluate the applicants.

In this context, the term 'interested persons' also applies to agricultural small producers. It is one of the important goals of the agreement to enhance the efficient operations of agricultural small producers and private farms, including their transformation into business ventures, and to improve their equipment supplies.

### Land Ownership To Be Restored Gradually

25000762B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
28 Jun 90 p 6

[Hungarian Telegraph Agency report: "Rehabilitation Law Being Prepared; Return of the Land—in Several Steps"]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture's mail has multiplied: citizens inquire how they can have their land returned—land, which was illegally expropriated in the course of forming cooperatives.

In this connection, Agriculture State Secretary Endre Mandy said that the ministry's experts are working hard to draft a legislative proposal for rehabilitation. The regulatory concept will be presented to the parties before the final draft.

The State Secretary did not provide details. He confirmed however that the legal violations that took place after 1947 and the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to property, notably private property, serve as the foundations for rehabilitation. The Ministry proposes that peasants be restored as rightful owners in a manner consistent with the proprietary conditions prior to the violation of laws, provided consideration is given to the full cultivation of the returned land. This can be resolved in several steps, so that the process of rehabilitation does not cause disruptions in either domestic supplies or in exports, and so that it is not accompanied by undesirable structural changes in agriculture. In applying the multi-step solution, those entitled to ownership under present law should be restored in their ownership immediately, according to the State Secretary. These include members of producer cooperatives working in common farms who want to leave. Such persons may be restored to ownership based on an existing National Assembly decision, and may dispose of such land freely. In the second stage land owners who reside locally, and who request return of their former property from a large farming plant for purposes of farming will have their requests processed.

According to preliminary plans, property settlement would be administered by local committees with the involvement of the government. To accomplish this, the draft proposal recommends the establishment of land settlement committees linked to the future autonomous governing bodies.

Creating such committees would be the responsibility of the government and the delegated members of already established voluntary land settlement committees, as well as representatives of parties in parliament.



## POLAND

### World Bank Opens Bureau in Warsaw

90P20089A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE  
in Polish No 62, 5 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The World Bank granted Poland a credit in the sum of \$250 million for the development of gas reserves and for a more effective use of energy. Thanks to this assistance, it will now become possible to expand the extraction of gas at approximately 20 percent from the present 5,500,000 cubic meters per year. Starting from January of this year, Poland received credits from this institution for the development of industrial and agricultural exports and also for transport and environmental protection. The final phase consists of negotiations on granting us a loan for \$300 million for the purpose of restructuring the economy. Judging from the statement of the vice president of the bank, W. Wapenhans, the possibility of granting Poland a loan of approximately \$1 billion per year in the course of the next two years is under consideration.

At the same time, an office of the World Bank has been established in Warsaw, which is to serve in an advisory capacity in the implementation of reform and provide financial services and technical assistance. This bureau is the first of its kind in the East Central European countries. Its headquarters is the Intraco building at Stawka Street 2 (17th floor). The director of the office is Mr. Ian Hume.

### State of Foreign Debt Analyzed; Alternative Solutions Proposed

90EP0720A Warsaw POLITYKA-EKSPORT-IMPORT  
in Polish No 7, Jun 90 p 13

[Article by Dariusz Rosati, director, Institute of Market and Price Research, Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation]

[Text] The atmosphere surrounding the plans to partially freeze the Polish debt in the West, particularly in the United States and France, is not the best today. Congress is still supporting us somewhat, but the recent speeches of James Baker, the American secretary of state, do not leave us with many illusions. It is said in the United States that we are coming forth with these proposals at a bad time, when the American budget and the financial institutions in that country are having their own troubles. The bankers, although not all are as explicit, echo the words of the politicians. They, too, do not want to hear about any reductions because they are afraid of the "demonstration effect" and "a spread of the disease."

Yet the Polish economic realities are such that continued rigid adherence to the "code of financial conduct" can only mire us deeper and will not be good for our creditor countries either. Greater flexibility on the part of the creditors, who are declaring aid and support for the countries of Eastern Europe, would be advisable today

not only for political reasons. They could also make money on their generosity. Dariusz Rosati attempts to prove this in the article below:

The international debate on ways of solving the problem of the Polish debt in convertible currencies has again reached an impasse. In February of this year, the governments of the Western countries granted Poland a temporary moratorium, agreeing to suspension of service on the stabilization program, i.e., to the end of March 1991. However, at the end of this time, Poland must again begin to pay interest (we are talking about sums on the order of \$3-3.5 billion dollars annually), and it is expected that in the future it would also begin to make payments on the principal. This is how the official decisions read.

Yet both the Polish side and our creditors (the Paris Club and the commercial banks) realize more and more that expectations that Poland will be able to repay this debt are unrealistic, at least in the foreseeable future. In the 1961-89 period Poland transferred to the West, in the form of instalment payments and interest, over \$18 billion; nevertheless, our debt grew during this period from \$25.9 billion to \$41.4 billion, three-fourths of which was due to the growing payment arrears. Poland paid \$1.5-2 billion a year, but simply in order to keep the debt from growing due to the arrears, it should have been paying \$2.5-3.5 billion in interest alone. As a result, our debt grew systematically, even though we received almost new credits which would have allowed us to increase our production and export capability. In 1989 we should have paid a total of \$6,547 million (including \$3,478 million in interest alone), yet we paid only \$1,572 million (of which \$1,075 million was interest), because we simply could not afford to pay more.

The time has finally come to seriously consider whether continuation on this path makes any kind of sense. First of all, we are now in a far more difficult situation than we were at the starting point ten years ago, because not only is our debt larger by \$15.5 billion, but our real payments capability is lower due to our depreciated production assets and society's lack of willingness to make any further sacrifices in order to repay a foreign debt. It is hard to imagine that Poland will be able to pay \$5-6 billion a year for the next several years so as to pay its debts in full. Consumption in Poland would have to be reduced at least another eight to 12 percent a year and, after all, consumption has already dropped dramatically. This would be political suicide for the government. Despite the continuing enormous popularity of the present government, society's limit of endurance in the face of the imposed policy of sacrifice in the name of stabilization is dangerously close. The recent strikes attest to this.

### No Chance

Even if our proposal for further belt-tightening were politically feasible, there is almost no chance that we could achieve, in a short time, a growth in export to the

West which would enable us to make the required payments. The quality of our production and the technical level of our enterprises is too low. The cost and benefits analysis would also have to take into account a drop in labor productivity, unavoidable with such a large reduction in consumption, and the effects of a larger emigration of persons leaving to work abroad, due to the worsening standard of living in Poland. These factors would also cause a reduction in the rate of economic growth, reduce consumption still further, and extend the whole operation of debt-reduction into future years. Debt-servicing, and even more debt-repayment, would cease, in our case, to be a question of good or bad policy, good or bad desires, or even the extent of necessary sacrifices—the real barrier would be simply the country's objective capabilities.

The awareness of these limitations is, I think, universal, although officially our creditors do not want to recognize this as being a fact. In particular, proposals to consider the possibility of drastically reducing or amortizing the Polish debt have been—thus far—systematically rejected, which, in any case, is not at all surprising. The idea of amortizing the debt has not been and is not popular in the West for many reasons.

Political and economic arguments are put forth against this idea. But the change in Poland's government and the point to which democratic transformations in our country have advanced, create, I believe, the preconditions for the removal of the political obstacles which stood in the way of recognizing the advisability of a reduction in the Polish debt in the 1980's.

More important in the present conditions are the economic-propaganda arguments, of which the following are cited the most frequently. First, amortizing or canceling the debt gives the impression that creditor countries are giving debtor countries a nonrepayable, or "free" service. This service consists of financing with the money of Western taxpayers, which arouses a natural opposition from the latter. Second, amortizing the debt of one of the heavily indebted countries may produce an avalanche of requests for debt-amortization on the part of numerous other debtor countries, especially the developing countries, and some of them are indeed in a very tragic financial situation. Mass freezing, or even only unilateral suspension of payments by a large number of countries, would endanger the stability of the world's financial system, which thus far has coped rather well with the global debt crisis. Finally, third, the moral aspect is important. Freezing would create a dangerous precedent; a reckless or unthrifty debtor would essentially be rewarded for not repaying, at least in part, obligations which he voluntarily assumed.

#### Another Viewpoint

Certainly these are grave reasons, but I believe that in light of the basically changed situation in Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR, they should be reexamined. Let us begin with the fact that amortizing a debt

which is practically uncollectible anyway does not constitute an actual transfer of money from Western taxpayers, but is only a change in a bookkeeping entry. The transfer of money was made at the time the credit was granted, which, for the most part, was back in the 1970's; now we are talking about a transfer of money only in reference to that part of the debt which has any real chance of being recovered in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the Polish debt is being sold on the secondary market at 13-15 cents on the dollar, which is vivid proof of the current value—in the eyes of Western financiers—of the Polish payments obligations, and how the market rates the chances of recovering the loaned money. The actual market value of the entire Polish debt is therefore approximately \$6 billion, which means that the creditors admit that \$35 billion of the money due them is, in fact, uncollectible.

And since we have mentioned the taxpayers, we should call attention to another aspect of the present situation. The distinct relaxation in East-West relations and the proclaimed, at the recent Soviet-American summit, end of the cold war, makes it possible to greatly reduce state expenditures for armaments. It is a universally known fact that Western taxpayers for scores of years have agreed to the necessity of spending hundreds of billions of dollars a year for the defense of democracy and to put a halt to the expansion of communism. Certainly it is not for us, the debtors, to say how the Western taxpayers should spend government funds, but it would surely be reasonable, in the light of the new situation in Europe, to consider the possibility of spending some of the money saved as a result of the reduction of armaments on assistance in solving the problem of the Central-Eastern Europe debt and on thus supporting the democratic and pro-West governments which are now evolving in that part of the world. I think that this is a much cheaper, and at the same time a safer form of defense of democracy than the continuation of expenditures for armaments.

#### Each One Separately

Let us go on to the second argument. The fact that some firm is bankrupting or applies for amortization of its debt in order to reorganize internally (for example, on the basis of Chapter 11 of the American bankruptcy code) does not signify that all firms that are in debt can stop servicing their obligations. In such a situation, each case is examined individually, taking into account both the firm's past actions aimed at overcoming its difficulties, as well as the chances that it will, itself, come out of its crisis. Poland has good reasons to apply for debt reduction because the efforts it made in the 1980's to service this debt were not able to prevent further deterioration of the situation. The national per capita income in Poland in 1989 was still five percent lower than it was in 1979, while the foreign debt was 70 percent higher. At the same time, during the last two years, labor productivity dropped, the condition of the natural environment worsened, and the internal debt to foreign currency

account holders in Polish banks grew. Under such conditions, a reduction in the payments burden becomes essential.

But more important, a reduction of debt in the case of Poland can contribute to an appreciable improvement in the payments balance if it is accompanied by a further liberalization of foreign trade, particularly the removal of restrictions on direct foreign investments. It can be shown that the benefits flowing from this, to a large degree, compensate for the bookkeeping losses appearing from debt reduction.

The amount of foreign capital now flowing into Poland is not very large, not only due to the country's uncertain socioeconomic situation and the still strong doubts as to the final results of the stabilization program, but also due to Poland's high indebtedness. This is the main source of strain in the payments balance, which, in turn, forces the Polish government to retain a number of restrictions dealing with the transfer of profits and the repatriation of capital from abroad. All of this puts a cramp on the freedom of investment and increases the uncertainty as to the future fate of foreign capital in Poland. The foreign debt overwhelms the Polish economy and even the most far-reaching concessions to foreign investors do not convince them that investing in Poland is a profitable and safe business. We cannot count on a mass inflow of foreign capital as long as there is the risk that the government, forced to service a colossal debt, may impose restrictions on the convertibility of currencies or on capital turnovers.

#### Benefits for Both

I believe that removing the debt burden from Poland would make it possible, on the one hand, to remove the existing restrictions in the flow of capital and the transfer of profits abroad, and, on the other hand, it would eliminate the threat of possible further-reaching restrictions in the future. This would make investment in Poland more attractive and also make it more profitable. During the last 4 years, scarcely \$187 million flowed into Poland in the form of direct foreign investments. Yet, in such countries as Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt, Colombia, Nigeria, Malaysia and Portugal, inflow of capital per year amounts to \$300 to \$600 million, and in China and Mexico, it is \$1.5 to 2.5 billion. Capital inflow will be even better in the GDR, where over the next few years, according to forecasts from West German economic forecasting institutions, it will amount to \$6 to 7 billion dollars a year.

If the inflow of foreign capital to Poland were \$300 to \$400 million a year, additional benefits for Western investors and entrepreneurs, stemming from the increased transfer of profits, could amount to \$2 to \$3 billion over the next five years. To this should be added the benefits connected with the takeover, by foreign capital, of the production activities in Polish enterprises at relatively low prices as part of the program for privatizing the economy.

#### Past Precedents

The third argument pertains to the establishing of a dangerous precedent. For the sake of accuracy, therefore, it should be stated that there have already been cases of a large-scale—more or less formal—reduction of debt (e.g., the purchase by Bolivia in 1988 of 85 percent of its foreign debt at 11 cents on the dollar with the consent of the creditor), or the drastic reduction in the debt burden resulting from debt servicing (e.g., the replacement of the debt by bonds in Mexico in 1989). But in the case of Poland, of greater importance is a more recent precedent. As we recall, most of Western Europe's indebtedness to the United States, stemming from the assistance covered by the Marshall Plan, was amortized in 1953. And these were huge sums; let us remember that the total amount of assistance sent during 1948-52 under the Marshall Plan amounted to over \$16 billion, which at that time was about five percent of the annual national income. Amortization of the debts stemming from this was one of the sources of the German and Italian "economic miracle," because it made it possible to hasten the rate of economic development and laid the groundwork for the introduction of Western European convertible currencies in 1957.

The experience derived from this operation shows that amortizing an extremely large debt brings benefits to both debtor and creditor. The conclusions drawn from the theory of international trade confirm this. It teaches that a change in the allocation of money from debt servicing to import purchases and expansion of production potential, produces, through the multiplier effect, a significant growth in income—in the creditor countries also. In the case of Poland, debt reduction would facilitate a larger demand for goods produced in Western countries, while enforcement of debt servicing would mean that further cuts in imports would have to be made and would also force us to push exports at any price, often on dumping conditions, with obvious harm to both sides. I believe that the justification for elimination of the Polish debt is greater than it was in the case of the Marshall Plan, because Poland is struggling not only with the effects of a deep economic crisis but is also making simultaneous fundamental changes in the social order.

The Polish society has taken on the ambitious and difficult task of rebuilding the economy by introducing a market system based on a strong private sector and rules of competition. How the Western countries decide the future of the Polish debt can make this task easier or much more difficult. The present state, when—paraphrasing the well-known joke—Poland pretends that it is paying and the creditors are pretending that they are receiving what is due them, cannot go on for a long time. We must end the present practice of piecemeal restructuring agreements and putting off payment of the debt until "later," because the experience of the 1980's has shown that "later" may be worse yet. During the past year the political, social and economic conditions for solving the Polish debt problem were formed and this opportunity should be taken advantage of.



The technical details of the agreement on this subject are, I believe, of secondary importance in the face of the gravity of the political decision as to the merits of the problem. One possible solution is the proposal, announced by the Polish side, that there be a once-only 80 percent reduction of the debt. But I think that another operation would be easier to implement: replacing the debt with Polish-government interest-free bonds, payable in 20 years, or with low interest rate bonds (two-three percent per year), payable in 30 years. An important element in such an agreement would be the requirement that the Polish government open up our economy further by liberalizing foreign trade and the flow of capital, and especially by removing restrictions in the transfer of profits on direct investments. I am convinced that only such a radical solution would permit us to finally free ourselves from the debt trap, bring benefits to both Poland and its creditors.

#### **Universal Privatization Going Well; Unforeseen Legal Issues Noted**

90EP0735A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
19 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by A.Z.: "Universal Happy With Stock Sales"]

[Text] After the first month, the initiators of the sale of Universal S.A. (a foreign trade enterprise) stock, are optimistic. As Universal's director of development, Tomasz Lukaszewicz, said at a press conference, the results are meeting expectations. Within two weeks, the entire portion of the subscription intended for units of the socialized economy will have been purchased. The buyers are financial firms, banks, insurance companies, etc.

The subscription of the portion intended for individuals is also going well. One-sixth of the offer was sold in a month. The portion intended for foreign purchasers should be sold without any problems.

During the subscription, problems emerged which are not covered by Polish law. For example, the purchase of stock with the intent to support charitable institutions. This is universally practiced in the West and is governed by relevant tax regulations. In Poland, the Bank of Economic Initiatives BIG S.A., is now taking steps to solve this problem by legal means.

Information has also been released on procedures governing secondary selling of the stock. It will be sold only by stock brokerages which are licensed by Universal. The first such office will be established by BIG Bank. After a State Securities Commission is organized, the system of stock sales will be adapted to the regulations defined by this commission.

Asked about Universal's financial condition, the reply was that in the first quarter of 1990, profits were 133 billion zlotys. The size of the dividend depends on the

profit which the company earns, however it is totally independent of the nominal price or the issuance price of the stock.

#### **Rural Uncertainty Reflected in Projections for Rapeseed Harvest**

90EP0736A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
16-17 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Edmund Szot: "How Much for a Ton of Rapeseed?"]

[Text] In several days already, most likely still this month, the rapeseed harvest will begin. The gossip and conjecture on the subject of its procurement has been circulating for a few weeks already: "They will not buy", "they will buy", "they will buy only what they can process right now", "they will pay whatever they want," etc.

The conjecture is a reflection of the general mood of certainty in agriculture, but has little in common with the reality. Certainly the plants in the fats industry will buy rapeseed, and not only as much as they can currently process into margarine and oil, but as much as they contracted to buy, because the farmers do not have the conditions for drying and storing grain.

Indeed, the procurement price of rapeseed is unknown at present. (Presumably all of the fats-industry plants, and there are seven of them, expect to establish a uniform procurement price for the whole country.) But it is doubtful that it will be established at the "wanted" level. It will really be an expression of the enterprises' economic capabilities.

—Both we and the fats industry have come to the conclusion that the farmers should receive 1,800 thousand zlotys for a ton of rapeseed this year, says the director of the Polish Union of Oleic Plants Producers office, Teofil Kolakowski.

—But the fats-industry plants can pay 1,100 thousand zlotys at the most if their products are to be competitive with butter and other fats, and with goods imported from abroad. The price difference would have to be covered by government subsidy.

We know from other sources that it will really be impossible to obtain a subsidy. Because of this, I predict that the farmers will sell this year's harvest at the prices offered to them, but they will not sow rapeseed next year. It was the same last year, when private farmers reduced the amount of land sowed for rapeseed from close to 200,000 hectares to slightly over 100,000 hectares.

There will be a total of 450,000 hectares for harvesting this year. The harvest forecast: about 1.1 million tons, i.e., close to 400,000 tons less than last year.

Rapeseed procurement will be conducted not only by the gmina "Peasant Self-Help Cooperatives," but also by the

State Farms, the Polish Grain Elevators, the farm production cooperatives, and some sugar factories. In short, everyone who is able to dry and store grain. In addition, the breakup of the procurement monopoly should help reduce its costs.

It should be noted that Poland ranks fifth in the world in the cultivation of rapeseed (after China, Canada, India and France), supplying five percent of the world's production. Strenuous efforts are now underway to increase the processing capacity of the Polish fats industry. But if Polish rapeseed and the Polish products made from it are to be competitive on the domestic and foreign markets, the present high production costs of this plant will have to be reduced.

Director Kolakowski estimates that the outlays for the cultivation and harvesting of rapeseed from one hectare of land total 3 million zlotys. But with the same outlays, one farmer harvests over 30 quintals, and another less than 20 quintals, from one hectare. It does not pay the second farmer to grow rapeseed even at a high procurement price, therefore it would be good if he were to give it up. But it would not be bad until all of them gave it up.

#### State Land Fund Notes Marginal, if Any, Profits in Land Sales

90EP0736B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
7 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Land for the Taking"]

[Text] In Poland, land was once the "measure"—as a professor so poetically described it—"of the universe and all that is valuable." People worked years for a morg of land, for a hectare of meadow, and sometimes in their entire lifetime were not able to make such a purchase. Today, land in our country is an almost worthless commodity. A young farmer can buy a medium-class hectare of land from the State Land Fund (PFZ) for the equivalent of ten bottles of vodka. A Dane or Belgian can buy a 30-hectare farm in Poland for a month's salary.

Here is the proof: The appraisal rate of one hectare of arable Class IIIb land in tax district I is 100 quintals of rye. The price of a quintal of rye, which is the basis for calculating the farm tax, is 27,300 zlotys (attention: after 1 July, the price of one quintal of rye will go up!). Therefore, a hectare of medium-class land would cost 2,730 thousand zlotys. However, the local organ of state administration can reduce the price of land up to 50 percent, i.e., to 1,365 thousand zlotys. Now the local organ of administration at the voivodship level can make a further reduction, and only 546,000 zlotys will be enough to pay for one hectare. If the farmer, in signing the contract, pays the entire price in cash, he gets a 30 or 50 percent discount. As a result, he purchases 1 hectare of land for 273,000 zlotys.

If this were the highest class land (class I), its appraisal rate in tax district I would equal the value of 145 quintals of rye. But in tax district IV, it would be only 94 quintals

of rye. Land classified V, VI, and VIz, can already be bought for a song. A hectare costs as much as a capful of pears, say the farmers.

The rules for selling the real estate of the State Land Fund are very extensible. The price for a hectare, depending on class and tax district, fluctuates from one to 145 quintals of rye. The people's council at the primary level can reduce or raise this price, depending on demand. Let us remember that the sale of land from the State Land Fund is now one of the main sources of income for the gminas. We already know that the price for land, fixed by the people's council, can be reduced by the local organs of administration at the state and voivodship levels.

The payment terms for the land purchased are also favorable. In signing the contract, the farmer pays only 20 percent of the price of the land (a young farmer pays only five percent), and pays the rest over 20 or 30 years in biannual instalments. Furthermore, the grace period before payments begin is zero, five, or three years, and the interest on the unpaid portion of the price is five percent per annum.

The organ of state administration can extend both the repayment period (up to 40 years) and the grace period (to seven years). If a farmer pays the full price, he receives a discount (30 or 50 percent). There is also a discount if instalments are paid before they are due.

Despite this, the State Land Fund's land reserves continue to be large. On 31 December 1989, they were estimated to be 785,000 hectares (of which 638,000 was arable land). Last year, 90,700 hectares were signed over to the State Land Fund and 105,300 hectares were disposed of.

Of the 785,000 hectares, over half (420,000) were transferred to farmers on long-term leases, 105,000 hectares were turned over to pensioners and annuitants for lifetime-use, 50,000 hectares were cultivated without contract, and 209,000 were under the direct administration of the State Land Fund, of which 96,000 hectares were allocated for forestation, and 113,000 hectares were land which was not suitable for development.

The largest State Land Fund reserves are in the following voivodships: Olsztyn, 40,000 hectares; Zielona Gora, 45,000; Bialystok and Chelm, 37,000 each; and Szczecin, 32,000. The smallest are in the following voivodships: Lodz, Lomza and Nowy Sacz, 2,000-3,000 each; and Warsaw, Krakow and Wloclawek, 3,000-4,000 each.

Land sales are conducted after candidates for purchase are decided or in the form of auctions. The latter form is used most often in those regions in which there is a large demand for land. At the moment we do not know what effect unemployment, which has been rising the last few months, will have on interest in purchasing land. But already last year, sales of State Land Fund lands clearly rose, helped along by the Sejm amendment to the law on providing retirement to farmers and their families.

### **Small Business Growth Noted in Trade, Some Services**

90EP0761A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
23-24 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Anna Sielanko: "Trade Is Winning Out Over Production"]

[Text] Regulations governing business premises and taxes recently went into effect which should promote the development of private economic activity and revive small business. An enormous amount of interest was generated by the directive issued by the minister of finance (it became effective 31 May 1990) pertaining to specific tax exemptions for individuals and companies made up of civilian individuals who will engage in trade, food services, other services, and processing. Are the practical effects of these legal regulations known yet?

They say at the Ministry of Domestic Trade that it is still too early for specific data, but that the rulings made will certainly have repercussions. This is apparent if only by the fact that the consultation center set up by the ministry has been literally swamped for several days. Specialists are giving advice and clearing up doubts and misunderstandings. It turns out, for example, that about one-fifth of the potential businesspeople would like to sell alcohol, and the regulations in effect at this time make this impossible. People are also asking where they can apply for premises and money to start up a business.

That more and more people want to "go on their own" and open their own shop or factory is also shown by the requests being submitted to commercial banks for credit. The banks call attention to the fact that the considerable reduction in interest rates is undoubtedly an incentive to make wider use of credit.

At "Agrobank" S.A. recently, several new clients a day apply for credit. These are mainly companies which most often want to engage in various types of business. For example, they want to import and sell, in Poland, second-hand clothing. There are applications for services, including construction, varnishing, printing, and tourism. There are people who want to produce household articles, and even equestrian equipment. The bank gives mostly short-term loans (up to one year), in amounts ranging from 10 to 150 million zlotys. The credit depends on the amount of capital which the company has, and that, as a rule, is not large.

A growth in interest in credit has also been noted at the Food Economy Bank, but there is no accounting which would make it possible to precisely define who is applying and for what. At that bank, most of the loans now are for about 1 billion zlotys, with the highest reaching 10 billion.

For detailed tax information the would-be businesspeople go to the treasury chambers. Those who want to apply for tax relief are directed to the treasury offices, having first received detailed information on the new regulations. The first applications to the treasury offices

are already in. They mainly pertain to sales activity, mostly of commercial articles. The matter of mobile (truck) sales generates a great deal of misunderstanding. Truck sales are excluded, which some people do not want to accept. Yet many young people apply to the treasury office at Praga-North [district of Warsaw] precisely to obtain tax relief by virtue of such an occupation.

Has the local administration at the primary level, which registers applications on the desire to engage in economy activity, accepted a larger number of clients in recent weeks? As of now, no. The matter comes down to the lack of premises—accommodations, as we were told in several neighborhood trade departments. Public auctions for premises taken away from trade organizations have not yet begun, yet the tax reliefs, somewhat automatically, apply to the merchants who have already taken over the places from the enterprises and have begun to operate them on their own account. These are mainly the former workforces of the shops. However, it takes time for the above-mentioned regulations to give rise to new processing plants or shops. New facilities have to be built, which, of course, takes a while.

It is possible also to share the fears of the local managers as to whether the new investments will really include farm-food processing (bakers, butcher shops, etc.), or all kinds of services, i.e., that which the authors of the regulations were really concerned about. Right now, for example, the main interest is focused on all kinds of trade and brokerage. Even many of the present producers and craftsmen are now also undertaking trade activity.

### **June Unemployment Figures Show Gradual, Not Sudden, Growth**

90EP0716C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
21 Jun 90 p 2

[Unattributed article under rubric "The Labor Market"]

[Text] The number of unemployed persons in Poland is gradually rising, but it is not a sudden growth. In mid-June, over 511,000 people were registered. This means an increase of almost 68,000 (15.5 percent), compared to the end of May. In March there were 266,000 jobless, in January—55,000. They now comprise 3.79 percent of the total employed population in the national economy (aside from private agriculture). Women continue to comprise less than half of the jobless (236,000). Approximately 9.5 percent of the persons without a job lost it as a result of group dismissals.

The situation in the individual voivodships is not changing either. The largest number of jobless continue to be in Katowice, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Olsztyn, and Kielce. Except that the largest—compared to the total employment in the economy—share of unemployment was



recorded in the following voivodships: Suwalki (9.94 percent), Lomza (9.47 percent), Ciechanow (9.04 percent), Konin (8.51 percent), Wloclawek (7.68 percent), and Plock (7.55 percent). According to the national index, the fastest rise in the number of jobless in the last few weeks was in the Biala Podlaska, Bielsko Biala, Rzeszow, Torun and Wloclawek voivodships.

Over 7,000 plants have announced that further group dismissals will be made, covering 280,000 people. They will affect the Warsaw, Katowice, Slupsk, and Skierniewice voivodships.

In the middle of this month there were about 45,000 job offers available to the unemployed, of which 40,000 were openings in manual and blue-collar positions.

Voivodship	Job Offers	Jobless	Voivodship	Job Offers	Jobless
Total	44,294	511,152	Nowy Sacz	359	9,099
Warsaw	10,701	10,773	Olsztyn	1,094	17,625
Biala Podlaska	54	4,311	Opole	860	6,776
Bialystok	270	15,600	Ostroleka	148	6,774
Bielsko Biala	1,260	7,448	Pila	192	8,735
Bydgoszcz	831	18,848	Piotrkow Trybunalski	516	12,896
Chelm	79	3,235	Plock	140	12,166
Ciechanow	216	10,314	Poznan	992	10,404
Czestochowa	597	8,698	Przemysl	144	7,267
Elblag	552	7,370	Radom	381	8,508
Gdansk	2,744	13,463	Rzeszow	186	12,956
Gorzow	411	9,475	Siedlce	215	6,905
Jelenia Gora	495	10,273	Sieradz	166	6,509
Kalisz	226	11,922	Skierniewice	146	6,417
Katowice	5,898	23,927	Slupsk	871	9,948
Kielce	1,130	17,528	Suwalki	221	14,202
Konin	215	11,341	Szczecin	1,723	7,629
Koszalin	583	10,307	Tarnobrzeg	135	8,658
Krakow	1,086	8,792	Tarnow	321	6,289
Krosno	37	9,313	Torun	376	13,669
Legnica	273	7,893	Walbrzych	804	10,891
Leszno	602	4,612	Wloclawek	145	9,434
Lublin	548	14,760	Wroclaw	3,244	12,104
Lomza	240	7,266	Zamosc	76	6,006
Lodz	1,292	20,221	Zielona Gora	389	11,595

### Polonia Firms: Potential Burdened by Unclear Rules, Taxes

90EP0733A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
6 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Z.L.: "Polonia Business"]

[Text] Last year sales in Polonia enterprises were over a billion dollars (795 firms now employ 85,000 workers). In accordance with the present laws, all of them will convert, with time, into joint ventures. Already 1,450 of the latter are registered, of which 605 have begun operations. These numbers illustrate the potential of the Polonia capital committed in our country.

The deputies at a meeting of the Sejm Commission on Liaison With Poles Abroad yesterday [5 June] deliberated on how to help remove the barriers standing in the

way of Poles abroad who want to invest in Poland. The information describing the ministry's plans for foreign economic cooperation did not arouse any enthusiasm. The commission members demanded specifics, and especially the undertaking of radical actions which would increase the effectiveness of the promotion of joint Polish-Polonia interests.

Stefan Lewandowski, president of the Polish-Polonia Investment Chamber, one of the pioneers in the development of this type of entrepreneurship in our country, spoke of the continual shortage of basic, practical information, the constantly changing regulations, and the need for new tax regulations, which would improve conditions for investment. The absence of a Ministry of Internal Affairs representative made it impossible for the deputies to develop a debate on the draft law on citizenship that day.

### Consumer Goods Industries Top List of Firms Facing Bankruptcy

90EP0733B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
2-3 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by (abo): "Thirty in Line for Bankruptcy"]

[Text] According to the data of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers Intervention Staff, 30 enterprises face bankruptcy in the near future. Now one of them, the A. Strug Wool Industry Association in Lodz, has decided to talk openly about the threat of bankruptcy. The list covers those state enterprises which owe money to the state treasury, and whom the bank has found to be insolvent.

Most of the enterprises on the list are in the light industry, mainly producers of woven fabric and yarn. Second in number are mines (including two hard coal mines, but from different towns), and transport enterprises. The machines and furniture industries are also represented.

According to information from the Universal Economic Bank (PBG) in Lodz, 46 enterprises—bank clients—have lost their creditworthiness. These are: 25 cooperatives (mainly in the "rural core"), 16 industrial enterprises, and five service organizations.

The worst situation is in the wool and cotton industry (seven enterprises are in very poor financial condition, including the A. Strug Wool Industry Association, which owes the PBG 13.8 billion zlotys).

One the factories listed demands that the bank not only postpone repayment of overdue credits, but that it also make access available to new "highly preferential" credits. In another factory, the cost of producing yarn is so high that the import price is almost two-fold less.

Factories reported by the PBG [Universal Economic Bank] face bankruptcy when it turns out that they owe money to the state treasury (are not paying taxes).

### Crafts, Services Note Some Growth; Collapses Continue

90EP0733C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
4 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Barbara Cieszevska: "Who's Going Down? Who's Emerging?"]

[Text] Figures prove uncontrovertibly that of the so-called "nonsocialized" establishments, or to put it simply, in crafts, trade and services, more firms are emerging than are collapsing. At least in Katowice Voivodship. I suggest we look at the table.

	Crafts	Trade	Services
Liquidated	1829	634	1152
Suspended activities	1437	564	1355
Newly activated	2944	5535	1674

Who is collapsing? In crafts almost all types of activities: tailors, bricklayers, shoemakers. There are no groups which are particularly susceptible to bankruptcy. Taking into account the number of those which liquidated their firms completely, and those who only suspended their activities, it is easy to calculate that 322 more firms collapsed than new ones emerged. But we can hope that some of those "suspended" workshops will revive. In services, among those collapsing, cabdrivers are a definite majority.

In trade, as we see, a definite increase is recorded. But "mobile" trade plays a large part here. Perhaps for now, even that is good.

### Bankrupt Firm Profiled: 'Andrzej Strug' Wool Industry Association

90EP0733D Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 22,  
2 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Krzysztof Krubski: "The 'Strug' Bankruptcy"]

[Text] Finally there is a bankruptcy. A real one, that does not even have money to pay its workforce, but at the same time is struggling to survive. So far, in light industry two plants have been put into liquidation, but these were really "walk-overs": Both the cotton plants in Zory and the "Konstalina" plant near Lodz, themselves, begged the Ministry of Industry to put an end to their misery. One might ask, which of the Lodz Molochs has fallen? Surprise—the Wool Industry Association's 'Andrzej Strug': a small factory just completing a large investment order, recently evaluated by World Bank experts, who wrote as follows: "There are real prospects here for profitable activity." And this is precisely the first regular bankruptcy!

From the standpoint of market rules, the situation is clear: The firm is not paying either a dividend or a sales tax, and furthermore it owes the Universal Economic Bank (PBG) 12 billion zlotys, which should be paid within a month. Knowing that monthly sales fluctuate around a billion zlotys, and recently there was not even money to meet the payroll, there can be no doubt that "Strug" is financially bankrupt in accordance with all of the rules of the game. It is not surprising that in mid-May, Bogdan Miedzinski, department director in the Ministry of Industry, signed and sent a telex to "Strug" informing the enterprise that it is subject to liquidation. No one in the factory was surprised because since March the bank has been holding all of the receipts and taking every cent of the money coming in, having notified the factory in advance that it is withdrawing its creditworthiness rating.

But how did it happen that a large firm, presumably flexible, with brand new factory floors, and blessed by the experts from the big world, fell? It happened very

ordinarily: "Strug" was eaten up by the interest on the investment credit, because it wanted to expand. The jobs that were already three-fourths completed were going well. Last year the firm had a net profit of 3 billion zlotys and was not too concerned about the fact that it would have to pay almost that many billions of debt over seven years beginning in June 1991. Everyone was sure that the profits from the new production floors will relieve them of all their worries. But then came January and with it the 55 percent interest, February brought another 23 percent, and March another 20 percent. And the ball game was over. There were scarcely enough profits to make the January interest payments, and February and March finished them off. The bank, as soon as it realized what was going on, immediately halted the investment credit, and furthermore, ordered that it be repaid by the middle of June of this year. It was clear to everyone that "Strug" was belly up. The financial collapse was so great that the last wage payment amounted to 150,000 zlotys per person for a month's work. It was not surprising that the workforce began to demand that the minister come, that Solidarity come, to the rescue, a protest action was called, and shortly afterwards a warning strike.

#### Stark Realization

But when the ministry only confirmed its intent with another telex, no one from the "top" came—and gave assurance that no one would come, the bank remained hard as a rock, and passersby became accustomed to the sight of white-and-red flags, the time for reflection had come. True, a one-hour warning strike was held, because that was the honorable thing to do, but immediately after it ended the workforce decided at a rally that a sit-in strike was out of the question, at least for now. A couple of people had such an idea but no one wanted to listen to them. Only the protest action was retained, treating it more like a mobilization of themselves rather than something with which to scare those on the outside.

Experts from the Lodz Solidarity Regional Board were asked to assist and the strike committee, after putting their heads together, began to look for a way out. Together with the management. True, there were also those who said that when you are sinking in a quagmire the more you move around the faster you sink, but they did not prevail. The experts expressed the customary amount of compassion and the normal amount of complaints at Balcerowicz's draconian methods, but immediately afterwards asked where, right here, could something be found which would convince the bank that there is still a chance.

The conversation was candid. The people said: We expected that it would continue as it was, that everything would sell. Our production was mainly seasonal and although our shawls and scarfs did not sell very well in the spring, we caught up in the fall. We don't know how to sell, we don't even know exactly what to produce so that it will sell. We have become accustomed to large commercial contractors and our contracts with small buyers come out badly, yet those are the kind that we

now have and will have. We have only two small shops of our own and that is not enough. It never entered our heads that we could sell to those who have more shops, and throughout the country, at that. Our export to the West is very rudimentary and we never paid attention to it. It was mainly for the honor of the factory. We counted on a permanent El Dorado on the other side of the Bug River and we miscalculated. We did not care about small clients, for whom we could perform services, for example, drying or dyeing fabrics.

The deputy head of the strike committee, Jan Flecek, even said: "They enslaved our minds to the point that we got out of the habit of thinking, and now we not only have to think, but we have to act, and quickly." No companies were established although there were opportunities to do so, all kinds of thriftlessness was concealed in the prices, and how is the bank supposed to believe us when in January we had 15,000 meters of fabric in stock and at the end of April we have ten times more?

The bitter complaints brought forth some decisions: Sell as much as possible, even below cost if necessary, because warehousing costs will be unbearable. Prepared a detailed offer for the foreign country which has been "nosing around" the factory for a long time. Simplify the organizational structure, go through the cadre, seek a loan (and if they demand a bill of exchange, give it, pledging assets as collateral). Sell the old factories as soon as you find a buyer. Remind the experts at the World Bank to explain what it means that "after a reconstruction plan is prepared, the Bank would be inclined to examine potential sources for this assistance." It was said: We need a Kaszpirowski to believe in ourselves.

#### Before the Damage

The "Strug" workforce is already past the damage stage. It knows what the specter of bankruptcy looks like and it is attempting to come up with some kind of concrete defense. But it is no secret that there are a good many such "Strugs" in Poland's light industry. The recession had a great effect on this market industry, because while the production rate in the nation dropped an average of 30 percent, in light industry it dropped slightly over 40 percent. It is a paradox that market reform destroys a market industry, but such a statement of fact does not change anything. Most of the firms in this branch have not yet experienced the damage. And this is evident.

Recently the cream of the *aktiv* met with the Ministry of Industry bosses. It was like in the good old days. The socio-realistic walls of the ministry building had often, in the past, heard these and similar slogans. T. Syryjczyk and his colleagues listened to speeches saying that the branch is facing annihilation and the government and the ministry should take action, because foreign markets must be retained and payments in Poland must not be held up. It is also the ministry's job to facilitate export and grant relief, to work jointly in overcoming the difficulties and actively stimulating economic changes.



Thought should also be given to the appropriate instruments and the matter should be taken up at the Council of Ministers. If not, then naturally, there will be social unrest, entire towns will bankrupt, and there will be total disaster.

The directors charged that they cannot direct, the union members charged that their rights are not being respected, and the self-managements charged that they are not being given enough consideration.

Minister Tadeusz Syryjczyk agreed completely with the discussants, that things would be much better if all of these matters were settled. He accused them of just one thing: Lack of originality. Because all of them threaten that if they do not get relief, money and preferences, there will be unrest and entire towns will die of hunger. He repeated what he had said many times before: that as long as everyone is groaning under the same burden there is fairness—no one has it any better or worse. In his opinion, light industry is being affected by the same drawbacks as are the other branches, therefore any kind of relief is out of the question. The government does not intend to yield, and, he repeated, it will not relent. And saying that he understands the difficult situation, he cited two figures: His ministry is the parent organ for 1,700 enterprises, and the specter of bankruptcy hangs over... 15 of them. He, too, was very surprised, and to this day does not understand why, in such extremely difficult conditions, no one is bankrupting. He explains that this may be due to the reserves at the beginning of the year and perhaps the very liberal credit policy of the banks.

In reply, he heard that he is telling people to swim in a pool filled with sulfuric acid. "The government and the ministry can be changed," said Syryjczyk, "but the pool will contain this same acid anyway."

#### Out of a Large Cloud...

Director Miedzinski intends to send a liquidator to "Strug" within ten days. As he was planning this in his office, one floor above, Minister Syryjczyk was informed that this factory will get a loan in the amount of a billion zlotys, guaranteed by B. Lukasiewicz, United Peasant Party deputy, resident of Lodz; they are also willing to invest larger sums. A meeting was held between the head of the PBG Bank and the Lodz authorities—in a spirit of mutual agreement. "Strug" was permitted to take over part of the aktivs, to give it enough money to make the payroll.

Two years ago we wrote in POLITYKA (No. 29/88) about the campaign to liquidate unprofitable or unnecessary firms. It turned out that this could not be done. Industry and trade then received—as A. Mozolowski put it—465 serious warnings. Could it be that this will now make it 466?

#### FRG Brewery Introduces Product to Polish Market

90P20092A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by A.S.: "For Beer Tipplers"]

[Text] Another Western firm desires to capture the Polish market. The firm's name is Furstlich Furstenbergische Brauerei—one of the oldest and most famous breweries from the Federal Republic of Germany, which produces beers of high quality, without artificial additives. At the outset, Furstenberg beer in bottles and barrels (sales price .33 liters—9,000 zlotys) will be supplied from the FRG to "Orbis" restaurants and better private establishments, and also to specialty stores selling alcohol. In the distant future, the firm wants to enter into a joint venture with one of the Polish breweries.

The PZ Randall firm, which is the importer of this beer to our country, also plans to supply the Polish market with Rhine and Mosel wines, and also soft drinks such as Fanta, Seven-Up, Sprite, and mineral waters.

#### Lower Tax Rates for Craftsmen Noted

90P20097A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 6 Jul 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Lower Taxes for Craftsmen"]

[Text] The finance minister has lowered the rates of tax cards for the second half of the year. Several examples of the lowered rates follow. The rates for blacksmiths repairing agricultural machinery, for laundry owners, and for hairdressing establishments, will be lower by ten percent. Owners of laundry presses, watchmakers, and shoe repairmen will have their taxes reduced by 20 percent. Rates for taxi drivers, transporting individuals and freight, will be reduced by 30 percent. The time period during which a high school graduate will not be counted in the employment figures will be extended from three to 12 months.

#### Poznan's International Fair Assessed as Adequate

90EP0713A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 25, 23 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Pawel Tarnowski: "More Talk Than Business"]

[Text] This year's Poznan International Fair [MTP] was to be different from previous ones. It was to correspond to the changes in the country's economic system, the growing problems of producers with selling their products and finally, the increasingly greater competition among them. Meanwhile, it looked and proceeded without any significant changes or events. Even the fair regulars could hardly detect any changes from previous years when viewing the exhibits and the decor of the stands.

However, something did change. There were fewer official home and foreign delegations, for example, which used to visit [the fair], represent and evaluate. In short, they would take up time while taxing the nerves and patience of the exhibit hosts. At last, there was no exerting oneself for the spectacular, if not to say, spectacle of the signing of contracts that for months had been set aside for this very occasion. "Party elements" disappeared from here as well, whereas the new spheres of authority did not, for the time being, feel the need to fill in this gap. If there were any ministers walking the halls—and I did see a few—they no longer were surrounded by an entourage of advisors and assistants. There was more of a relaxed atmosphere and normal business discussions at the fair. There was somewhat less of the "restaurant activity on the outskirts of the booths carried out without any valid justification," as one of the managers put it. In past years, one would often have the impression that this [the restaurants] was a goal in itself. I suspect that this is no longer the case but I would not rule out such old habits.

The "attendance list" here did not change much but it is significant. Businessmen from Cuba and North Korea did not show up once again in Poznan. Following last year's experiences, the exhibitors from Argentina, Iraq, Lesotho, and Palestine backed out of the MTP. Instead, the Chinese and the Cypriotes showed up after a year's absence. After a 26-year absence, representatives of Chile also returned to Poznan. The stands of the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and the United States grew significantly. The Japanese have already spread out over four halls. All in all, the surface area occupied by Western countries, if this term has any meaning left, has increased markedly. The former socialist countries have retained their past positions. On the other hand, the surface area leased by 1,800 domestic exhibitors decreased. Today, everyone is counting money but not many have too much of it. In Poznan, as elsewhere, everything has gone up in price horribly. At the 62d MTP, Polish firms paid an average of 250,000 zlotys per square meter of leased exhibit space in the hall. Foreign firms paid even more. The construction of a stand entailed another 100,000 zlotys per meter. Bills for hotels amounted to millions. Therefore, many managers of the various firms preferred to limit their expanse and lavishness. The motto prevailed: this time, it will be tighter but brighter. In this way, they saved a total of 14,000 square meters and a considerable sum of zlotys. These days, it is worth doing.

If we were to take a look at the exhibitors, we would see that the old group that has known each other for years came to Poznan. All the large foreign trade centers were present as well as renowned manufacturers of machinery who for years have been conducting business with foreign countries. I am told that some stands of private firms and some small joint ventures joined in but they did not stand out particularly. One week's presence at the fair at an average-sized booth that does not remind one of a tree hollow and has back facilities costs tens of

millions if not several hundred million zlotys these days in Poznan. From among those who are just starting out, not many can afford such an expense. Therefore, many beginners have remained at home and are conducting business by telephone.

As opposed to the exhibitors, the clientele has changed at least partially. Besides the "old faces," owners of large private shops, agents starting out in their career, and manufacturers making their first turns began to arrive for business talks.

Many of these business people limited their visits to Polish booths which was slightly out of line with the official, international character of the event. However, domestic producers were pleased. They sold to whom-ever came along as long as it was for a fair price. Briefly speaking, a similar, early fall national fair on a small scale was held concurrently in Poznan in June. This bothered no one. The zloty has, indeed, become equally good as the dollar, and even better. Such are the times.

From the perspective of Poznan, it can be seen that of the two groups of exhibitors, domestic and foreign, the latter, as usual, adapt more quickly to the changes in the Polish economy. The dramatic drop in demand for capital investment goods in Poland means that from year to year, machinery, factory equipment, and industrial electronics disappear gradually from the various pavilions and are replaced by all kinds of consumer goods for which demand diminishes somewhat more slowly.

This year in Poznan, virtually no European car company of importance was missing. As usual, the Japanese were there as was South Korea, the Germans, and the Americans with a Chevrolet, which according to the advertising slogan is the "Heartbeat of America." Equally numerous and attention getting were the home electronics booths which were set up by West German, South Korean, and Japanese firms. This shifting of emphasis will probably be even more evident next year. Polish investors clearly do not have money for major purchases and foreign manufacturers of machinery and equipment walked around Poznan with rather glum faces this year. If someone did buy something in this line, it was rather small appliances and at the same time, for a large group of investors. For example, bakers bought equipment from the French for 50 small bakeries. The times of giant contracts and purchases by factories to be kept under lock and key have ended for now. But one can hardly be pleased with the fact that there are increasingly less investments being made in Poland.

It was also quite evident at the Poznan fair that Polish trade, and actually the entire economy, is intensively developing old ties with the West and is looking for new contacts. This follows not just from the fact that demand in the country is growing weaker whereas for many producers selling for foreign exchange currency is more profitable than for rubles. Another reason is the obvious technical difficulties in attempts to negotiate with partners from the East. The fruitless contacts of Polish

businessmen with representatives of other CEMA countries or the lack thereof at the MTP resulted from lack of knowledge on both sides of next year's rules of the game, the manner of clearing accounts, the profitability of trade, etc. The information alone that this trade will also be conducted in foreign exchange is most certainly not enough. It was evident in Poznan that enterprise managers were outrightly restraining from making commitments for next year whereas discussions were being put off for a later date when more details would be known. There were also instances where partners from East European countries, who had announced their visits earlier, did not make it to the fair at all. For those firms, that have to plan their production well in advance, this current state of uncertainty constitutes quite an impediment. Our current year's large trade advantage with socialist countries should not deceive anyone. Next year, things may already be different.

Not much was being said at the fair, which as a whole was no better or worse from the previous ones, about the future of this event. There was no time nor any great desire to do so. On the other hand, there is no shortage of opinions that the current formula of this gathering has ultimately outlived itself whereas the trade shows organized til now at various times in the area of agriculture, furniture manufacturing, telecommunication, tourism, printing, crafts and arts are not an adequate recompense. Thus, the new coordinator of the fair, who next year will inherit the legacy of the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade from the minister of foreign trade, will have something to think about. At present, there are plans to transform the Poznan International Fair into a state enterprise, a corporation, or a limited liability company. On the other hand, there is less talk of concepts of their functional adaptation to the needs of the changing Polish economy as well as of the methods of raising funds for the "biological renewal" of the market structures, their development and the expansion of Poznan's hotel base.

Finally, the proper arrangement of relations with the city authorities, who always coorganized this event and at the same time felt deceived and left out in the distribution of profits, await the new owner, whoever he may be. If this does not happen, and not much will change at the MTP as well, then this event, whose form was shaped in totally different times, will become even more provincial.

#### **'Uniwersal' Share Sales, Shareholding Concepts Discussed**

90EP0761B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
23-24 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Jerzy Scibor-Kaminski, director, First Equity and Bond Company Ltd., "subcontractor" of the Bank for Economic Initiatives, by Danuta Walewska; place and date not given: "An Idea for a Polish Package"]

[Text] [Walewska] Three months ago I had to write an article about the capital market in Poland. I wanted to write just one sentence...

[Scibor-Kaminski] ...that there is no capital market in Poland.

[Walewska] Those three months have gone by and you were able to organize the beginnings of this market. The sales of "Uniwersal" stocks have been successful.

[Scibor-Kaminski] That was no accident. I came to Poland for the first time exactly at this same time last year. I wanted then to determine what the possibilities for business were. I also determined at that time, that there was no capital market. Anyway, that was very easy to ascertain.

[Walewska] Were you horrified? Or maybe you were happy.

[Scibor-Kaminski] You remember the story about the salesman who went to Africa and saw everyone walking around barefoot? And thought that shoes should immediately be sold to everyone? It was necessary, therefore, to determine whether these "shoes" are necessary. We have approached the Polish market with optimism. And it should be remembered that at that time many bank representatives were coming here, and quickly leaving, realizing that if the infrastructure does not improve it will be very difficult to do anything.

[Walewska] You will be able to survive this?

[Scibor-Kaminski] We must measure our strengths against our intentions. Our strengths are meager in comparison with the large banks, but our costs are also lower. However, insofar as information and efficiency are concerned, we yield to no one. I really believe that we will survive. We are waiting for important government decisions pertaining to the flow of foreign capital. And for printing services to improve, so that printed documents will look as they should.

[Walewska] What here in Poland angers you the most?

[Scibor-Kaminski] Failure to keep promises and telecommunications. But I know that it is easy to come here and criticize. On the other hand, a great deal can be improved almost immediately. For example, sales courtesy, office courtesy—we also have to know where that goal is which we are aiming at. Our aim is to see a capital market in Poland.

[Walewska] How did the Bank of Economic Initiatives (BIG) prepare itself to sell "Uniwersal"?

[Scibor-Kaminski] I am only a subcontractor here. But first, BIG knew that it wants to do this. And that regardless of what the obstacles would be, they would be overcome.

[Walewska] Not very many people are employed in BIG.

[Scibor-Kaminski] We did not want to employ a lot of people because we were more concerned with creating a



certain climate, a professional subculture which will help us master a situation before we take on more serious tasks.

[Walewska] What happens after "Uniwersal"? Or is this an indiscreet question?

[Scibor-Kaminski] Only the answer can be indiscreet. We have another four projects which are in various phases of preparation. Probably they will all end with the sale of securities. There are many more such possibilities, but as I said, we have to measure our strengths against our intentions. We agreed to "Uniwersal" because we knew that the aktiwi here are small. If this had been a small firm, somewhere outside of the city, the working conditions would have been much worse. Insofar as the next firms are concerned, I can only say that some of them are known in Poland, and others are known in their communities.

[Walewska] But you believe that sales of stock will help them?

[Scibor-Kaminski] We have to understand the mechanism of stocks. That a large package does not have to be issued immediately. That it is possible to start with a small package. There are many such possibilities. We are working on them all the time in London and other financial capitals. We also have ideas for a "Polish package," for ways to sell these stocks abroad. We are very eager to start this work because we see the competition growing day by day. At this very moment, the Hungarian IBUSZ [expansion unknown] is competing with "Uniwersal" for the same investors.

[Walewska] Do you believe that Poland is a good market for investment of foreign capital?

[Scibor-Kaminski] It is a market that is getting better all the time. But there are still many questions without answers. We do not know how the matter of the inflow and outflow of foreign capital will be settled. What has

been brought in can be taken out, but what about the earnings? The matter of dividends has been regulated, but what about the capital invested in the stock? Those are the questions to which there are no answers. And the Hungarians are boasting that they already have such answers and are not setting any limitations.

[Walewska] You are known to be an opponent of securities....

[Scibor-Kaminski] We do not want a stock to be a piece of paper, for it to be a record, with the stockholder in possession of the certificate. Throughout the world there is a retreat from securities. Administration of securities is very burdensome. It would be unreal to transplant such a system to Poland. What we intend to do at BIG and "Uniwersal"—and we have already proposed this to the Ministry of Finance—is to dispense with these formalities. That is what computers are for, to register transactions. We already have some procedures and tests which will allow us to determine to what degree Poles are able to accept this system. Rejection of the system will cause complications and increase costs. Next week we will begin to buy and sell BIG stocks. They will be locked in a safe, but everyone who buys them will have proof of ownership. At the moment, in addition, we are still issuing certificates, but we have hopes that soon this will not be necessary, that people will understand that it is not necessary. If the stocks are sent by mail, the wife can throw them out when she cleans the house, or the dog can eat them. I know of such cases.

[Walewska] Is everyone suited to being a stockholder?

[Scibor-Kaminski] Theoretically, yes, but in practice, no. Because not everyone is able to comprehend that when he purchases stock he becomes a coowner. Many people continue to believe that this is a loan. This is not a loan! It is, instead, a risk. State bonds can be purchased without taking a great risk. Meanwhile, we have to learn to submit to the mood of the people and create a market in which they will have confidence.

## POLAND

### Ukrainians in Poland Report Improving Relations, Cultural Atmosphere

90EP0723A Warsaw GAZETA I NOWOCZESNOSC  
in Polish No 22, 7 Jun 90 pp 1, 4-5

[Article by Stanislaw Marek Krolak: "We Do Not Want To Emigrate"]

[Text] Many Ukrainians live in Elblag and around it. I went there in order to learn what their concerns are today and ask about the place they have found for themselves in a new, emerging Poland. I deliberately failed to take any addresses or letters of recommendation.

The path to the heirs of St. Vladimir was to be shown to me by those among whom they live. However, I did not think that getting on the trail of the Ukrainian community would be that difficult in a city in which the residents, for the most part, come from the borderlands. It turns out that most people know little about the minority residing among them.

The random citizens of Elblag whom I met were puzzled, but not on account of the question itself. To be sure, they knew that Ukrainians do live around there somewhere, but personally they did not know a single one. Some suggested that I begin with a small church downtown in which "some people of a different religion worship." They did not know who those "some" were and what their denomination was. However, the trail was the right one. A sign fastened to the wall announced that this was a Greek-Catholic church. Apart from this, there was not a soul, and the doors were tightly shut.

To be sure, there was an entry in the phone book for the "Ukrainian Cultural Association," but I found only a sign with the name of the association on closed doors and no information at 20 Teatralna Street, in a dilapidated building made of large prefabricated elements. Residents from adjacent dwellings did not know anything:

"You do get to hear them from time to time. Some woman used to come here, but not any more. Besides, we do not take an interest in them."

While looking for the USKT (Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Association) I came upon a beautiful mansion, the old presbytery of the once magnificent Church of the Body of Christ with the only "floating roof" in Europe. At present, the mansion is occupied by the Society of Polish-Soviet Friendship. Its functionaries, engaged in dispatching yet another "friendship bus," were frankly amazed:

"A Ukrainian association? In Elblag? Never heard about it!"

I asked: "Have you heard about Ukrainians?"

A corpulent gentleman answered: "We do get to hear about them from time to time, but this topic is of no interest to us."

In the Citizens Committee, they have heard about Ukrainians, but not a single one is involved in the activities of the committee. They have also heard that the Ukrainians have their own association. This is all. A woman said: "They keep to themselves." A man recalled that he had recently met a Zamech [Engineering Enterprise] engineer who is Ukrainian. This was how I met Andrzej Nakonieczny, the chairman of the local chapter of the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (several months ago, the USKT transformed itself into a union).

I asked engineer Nakonieczny about the reason for covering their tracks so diligently. He said that I was just out of luck. Actually, they do not hide, but do not make a special effort to make their presence known either. Their activities are restricted to their own community.

He said: "Being a Ukrainian in Poland is really no honor. Forty years of politics have left a mark. We are seen in keeping with a stereotype: Ukrainians are murderers and thieves. We do our stuff, but we do not boast about it. A majority of the members of our union do not admit to their ethnic background."

About 2,000 people in 25 circles belong to the chapter. The Ukrainian community is much larger. In Elblag alone, there are about 150 families. The SB [Security Service], the only institution that has taken an interest in them, must be the only one to have the exact data. Andrzej Nakonieczny has been called in many times for conversations with the officer in charge of the Ukrainians. He added: "In all fairness, I should say that once in 45 years we met with a party secretary." They wanted to submit a report on the situation of Ukrainians in Poland to the Sejm of the previous term. It did not work. An office chief refused to accept the document.

The path of Andrzej Nakonieczny to Elblag is not in any way different from that of other people from those parts. He was born in the village of Mycow, Belz Gmina, in Hrubieszow Powiat. In late June 1947, the village was surrounded by troops. They were ordered to bring clothes and food, loaded onto wagons, and taken to Warez (currently in the USSR). They spent two days there without a roof over their heads. From Warez, they went on foot to the nearest railway station in Werbkowice. Several days later, they were put in boxcars, and sent to Elblag through Olsztyn.

Andrzej was 13 years old, but he remembers Olsztyn because he got seriously sick there. On 12 July, they arrived at their destination. The PUR [State Repatriation Administration] assigned them to Nowakowo Gmina, the village of Nowotki. According to instructions, Ukrainians could account for no more than ten percent in any single village.

Hunger is what he remembers the most from this time.

Nobody took any interest in them, except for the UB [Security Administration] people who walked in front of their windows in the evening and eavesdropped on their conversations.

"Thanks to Solidarity, the situation has changed by now. At work, they all know that I am Ukrainian, and I do not feel discriminated against for that reason in any way. Moreover, there is no ill will. They have begun to write about us and our history; we have our own deputy. We are grateful to GAZETA WYBORCZA for news from the Ukraine. What goes on there is at present the most important issue for us."

Jaroslav Brodiuk belongs to the young generation of the emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia. He began his studies at the diocesan seminary in Lublin, and now he continues to study in Rome. In two years, he will become a priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which so far has been called the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church.

"There is a tremendous misunderstanding when it comes to names. Even Catholic priests do not know what church we represent. Usually they say the Uniate Church. We are not Uniate at all! This is how we may call those who 300 years ago brought about the union with Rome. We belong to the same church as the majority of Poles, except that we have different rites and a different liturgy. Unfortunately, these issues are not being explained. I study at a diocesan seminary, and I know that even priests do not know the history of the church well."

Jaroslav believes that much work on developing its own intelligentsia, writing the history of the Ukraine and of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and on building regular economic institutions lies ahead for the Ukrainian community. They do have a rich tradition.

He observed: "Many people may be surprised, but before the war the Ukrainians had well-developed cooperatives. We would like to engage in such activities in cooperations with the Poles because it makes no sense to create our own ghetto. We should clear up as soon as possible all historical events with the people among whom we live, in terms of a dialogue rather than of the wrongs which the elder generation feels very acutely. This dialogue is already coming about, though the elder generation has a very strong prejudice, perhaps, on both sides."

Henryk, who is in his twenties and who would not agree to our mentioning his name because the people he works with do not know that he is Ukrainian, said that the image of a Ukrainian in Polish society has been changing slowly. Unfortunately, Ukrainian culture is almost unknown. Therefore, there is no foundation on which the peoples develop opinions of one another.

They owe a lot to Solidarity, first of all the fact that after years of silence they came to exist as a community. However, they did not become actively involved in the structures of Solidarity. Why? First of all, because of apprehensions. They were not sure that the time had

come, that new times were coming. They merely watched the impulses of the 1970's, 1980's, and the last year. They watched these impulses with sympathy and hope but were afraid to join this.

Perhaps, it is not time yet? Could a decision come from the top to suppress this, and will they catch it again? For the same reasons, they do not reveal in schools that they are Ukrainian. If somebody wants to defend traditions openly he goes to the Ukrainian high schools in Gorowo Ilawieckie or Legnica.

These are not simple matters. Real tragedies happen. Sometimes, Ukrainian activists who defend traditions and caution against polonization encounter resistance within their own families. For example, Mr. Milczak was left alone. His wife and children left because they did not want to be Ukrainian.

Two years ago, magnificent celebrations of the millennium of the baptism of Russia were held all over the world. The most magnificent celebration was held at Jasna Gora, as everyone admits. However, this was a bittersweet occasion. A substantial share of the most valuable, educated young people went to Rome and did not return, one-third in the case of Elblag. They remained, but not because they were Ukrainians and were persecuted here. They remained because they had had enough of communism and because they had lost hope, like thousands of other Polish citizens. However, this was a real disaster for the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the numbers of which are modest.

There are other problems as well. Apprehensions appear about chauvinism exhibited by national groups. Mr. Eugeniusz Brodiuk, Jaroslav's father, believes that racism has become apparent at this point. This is a very strong statement, and it may apply to narrow groups. Nobody is smashing the windows of the Ukrainians and persecuting them at work. However, what kind of attitudes did the infamous "Open Studio" reveal? We gain freedom and we immediately mark a place in the ranks for the Jews, the Ukrainians, and all those who are somehow different from the majority.

Jaroslav objected: "Despite everything, these are isolated cases. Observing the communities of the West I understood only there that, despite the wrongs, the Ukrainians in Poland have preserved their ethnic awareness the best. The traditions are similar. Western communities reach the Ukraine through Poland."

Father Dean Jozefczyk from St. Michael's Parish in Elblag stresses that the coexistence of the Polish and Ukrainian communities has never been as good as it is at present. There are no conflicts on ethnic grounds at all, which is not to say that there are no conflicts.

Priests from the local Ukrainian parish, Senior Jan Jaremin who has been working in Elblag since the



liberation and the young Andrzej Soroka, are also optimistic. Contacts with the clergy of the Latin rite may not be cordial, but they are proper. They invite each other to their celebrations.

To be sure, altercations do happen. In Braniewo, the dean refuses to hand over an unused church to the Ukrainians despite the consent of the bishop; the same is the case in Nowotki. Father Soroka once had an unpleasant experience in Slupsk Voivodship when a local parish priest did not let him say a funeral mass for the priests's own grandfather. However, these are isolated cases, local peculiarities, so to say.

In Elblag, there are no misunderstandings. For several years, they have had their own small church downtown, they have repaired it, and they are doing the iconostasis now. Previously, the Sisters of St. Catherine gave them shelter in their chapel. Now they have their own church.

Father Dean Jozefczyk, against whom some people hold the fact that he cares for the Ukrainians too much, said: "However, they were not exactly eager to go to their own church. I could not understand this, I had to persuade them."

Father Jaremin explained that hesitation appeared when some of the believers announced that they would not go to the new church. On Zamkowa Street, at the Sisters of St. Catherine, nobody knew who attended. At the new location, they had to go to the Ukrainian church in full view of everyone, including neighbors who go to the Church of the Charity of Our Lord which is located nearby.

There are also minor matters, such as, for example, the first communion. It is hard to explain to a child who goes together with his peers to school and to religious instruction that he should not have his communion together

with other children. This is why it happens that Ukrainian children have the celebration twice—in a [Ukrainian] church and in a [Catholic] church.

This is not a problem, but it indicates what it means to be different in the midst of a majority. Father Dean Jozefczyk observed that most frequently it is the parents from the families of intellectuals who ask for communion in a Latin church, though they baptized their children according to Ukrainian rites. Father Jozefczyk assumed that these phenomena definitely have something to do with the process of polonization.

Henryk said: "Our attitude toward the Poles is very favorable, and we believe that even the most painful issues must and may be cleared up quietly, all the more so that the people in the Ukraine are waking up slowly, and at some point the issue of interstate relations will arise. The foundation may be prepared right now.

"You have a still festering wound such as Katyn. Our people feel a lot on account of Jaworzno, and await the truth about this tragedy. The UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army] has a very bad reputation. However, these people had a goal, after all an important thing—independence.

"We should separate crimes from ideas, degeneration from attempts to create national armed forces. All of this needs to be explained, and not only to the Poles. We need to explain it to ourselves. We have yet to write a history of our people. There will be many common elements in this history.

"Even the events already studied merit a second look. For example, how was the union perceived by the Ukrainian side?

"One more point: We do not want to go back or emigrate anywhere. We want to work and live here, in this country, in Poland."

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**DATE FILMED**

29 Aug. 1990